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Outline of the Tutorial
This tutorial consists of five lectures on cryptography, based on the lecture notes for
a course on this subject given by the author in August, 2001, at the 11th Jyva¨skyla¨
Summer School in Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland. As the title suggests, a particular focus
of this tutorial is to emphasize the close relationship between cryptography and
complexity theory. The material presented here is not meant to be a comprehensive
study or a complete survey of (the intersection of) these fields. Rather, five vivid
topics from those fields are chosen for exposition, and from each topic chosen,
some gems—some particularly important, central, beautiful results—are presented.
Needless to say, the choice of topics and of results selected for exposition is based
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on the author’s personal tastes and biases.
The first lecture sketches the history and the classical foundations of cryptog-
raphy, introduces a number of classical, symmetric cryptosystems, and briefly dis-
cusses by example the main objectives of the two opposing parts of cryptology:
cryptography, which aims at designing secure ways of encryption, versus crypt-
analysis, which aims at breaking existing cryptosystems. Then, we introduce the
notion of perfect secrecy for cryptosystems, which dates back to Claude Shannon’s
pioneering work [Sha49] on coding and information theory.
The second lecture presents the public-key cryptosystem RSA, which was in-
vented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA78]. RSA is the first public-key
cryptosystem developed in the public sector. To describe RSA, some background
from number theory is provided in as short a way as possible but to the extent nec-
essary to understand the underlying mathematics. In contrast to the information-
theoretical approach of perfect secrecy, the security of RSA is based on the assump-
tion that certain problems from number theory are computationally intractable.
Potential attacks on the RSA cryptosystem as well as appropriate countermeasures
against them are discussed.
The third lecture introduces a number of cryptographic protocols, including the
secret-key agreement protocols of Diffie and Hellman [DH76] and of Rivest and
Sherman (see [RS93,RS97]), ElGamal’s public-key cryptosystem [ElG85], Shamir’s
no-key protocol, and the digital signature schemes of Rivest, Shamir, and Adle-
man [RSA78], ElGamal [ElG85], and Rabi and Sherman [RS93,RS97], respectively.
Again, the underlying mathematics and, relatedly, security issues of these protocols
are briefly discussed.
A remark is in order here. The protocols presented here are among the most
central and important cryptographic protocols, with perhaps two exceptions: the
Rivest–Sherman and the Rabi–Sherman protocols. While the secret-key agreement
protocol of Diffie and Hellman [DH76] is widely used in practice, that of Rivest
and Sherman (see [RS93,RS97]) is not (yet) used in applications and, thus, might
appear somewhat exotic at first glance. An analogous comment applies to the
Rabi–Sherman digital signature protocol. However, from our point of view, there is
some hope that this fact, though currently true, might change in the near future. In
Section 3.5, we will discuss the state of the art on the Diffie–Hellman protocol and
the Rivest–Sherman protocol, and we will argue that recent progress of results in
complexity theory may lead to a significant increase in the cryptographic security
and the applicability of the Rivest–Sherman protocol. One line of complexity-
theoretic research that is relevant here is presented in Section 5; another line of
research is Ajtai’s breakthrough result [Ajt96] on the complexity of the shortest
lattice vector problem (SVP, for short), which is informally stated in Section 3.5.
The fourth lecture introduces interactive proof systems and zero-knowledge pro-
tocols. This area has rapidly developed and flourished in complexity theory and has
yielded a number of powerful results. For example, Shamir’s famous result [Sha92]
characterizes the power of interactive proof systems in terms of classical complexity
classes: Interactive proof systems precisely capture the class of problems solvable in
polynomial space. Also, the study of interactive proof systems is related to proba-
bilistically checkable proofs, which has yielded novel nonapproximability results for
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hard optimization problems; see the survey [Gol97]. Other results about interactive
proof systems and the related zero-knowledge protocols have direct applications in
cryptography. In particular, zero-knowledge protocols enable one party to con-
vince another party of knowledge of some secret information without conveying
any bit of this information. Thus, they are ideal technical tools for authentication
purposes. We present two of the classic zero-knowledge protocols: the Goldreich-
Micali-Wigderson protocol for graph isomorphism [GMW86,GMW91] and the Fiat-
Shamir protocol [FS86] that is based on a number-theoretical problem. For an in-
depth treatment of zero-knowledge protocols and many more technical details, the
reader is referred to Chapter 4 of Goldreich’s book [Gol01b].
The fifth lecture gives an overview on the progress of results that was recently
obtained by Hemaspaandra, Pasanen, and this author [HR99,HPR01]. Their work,
which is motivated by the Rivest–Sherman and the Rabi–Sherman protocols, stud-
ies properties of functions that are used in building these two cryptographic proto-
cols. It is results about these functions that may be useful in quantifying the security
of these protocols. In particular, the key building block of the Rivest–Sherman pro-
tocol is a strongly noninvertible, associative one-way function. Section 5 presents
the result [HR99] on how to construct such a function from the assumption that
P 6= NP. In addition, recent results on strong noninvertibility are surveyed, in-
cluding the perhaps somewhat surprising result that if P 6= NP then there exist
strongly noninvertible functions that in fact are invertible [HPR01]. These results
are obtained in the worst-case complexity model, which is relevant and interesting
in a complexity-theoretic setting, but useless in applied cryptography. For cryp-
tographic applications, one would need to construct such functions based on the
average-case complexity model, under plausible assumptions. Hence, the most chal-
lenging open research question related to strongly noninvertible, associative one-way
functions is to find some evidence that they exist even in the average-case model.
As noted above, our hope of obtaining such a result is based on recent progress
on the shortest lattice vector problem accomplished by Ajtai [Ajt96]. Roughly
speaking, Ajtai proved that this problem is as hard in the average-case as it is in
the worst-case model. Based on this result, Ajtai and Dwork [AD97] designed a
public-key cryptosystem whose security is based merely on worst-case assumptions.
Ajtai’s breakthrough results, his techniques, and their cryptographic applications
are not covered in this tutorial. We refer to the nice surveys by Cai [Cai99] and,
more recently, by Kumar and Sivakumar [KS01] and Nguyen and Stern [NS01] on
the complexity of SVP and the use of lattices in crytography.
The tutorial is suitable for graduate students with some background in computer
science and mathematics and may also be accessible to interested undergraduate
students. Since it is organized in five essentially independent, self-contained lec-
tures, it is also possible to present only a proper subset of these lectures. The only
dependencies occurring between lectures are that some of the number-theoretical
background given in Section 2 is also used in Section 3, and that the Rivest–
Sherman secret-key agreement protocol and the Rabi–Sherman digital signature
protocol presented in Section 3 motivate the investigations in Section 5. This last
section contains perhaps the technically most challenging material, which in part
is presented on an expert level with the intention of guiding the reader towards an
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active field of current research.
There are a number of textbooks and monographs on cryptography that
cover various parts of the field in varying depth, such as the books by Goldre-
ich [Gol99,Gol01b], Salomaa [Sal96], Stinson [Sti95], and Welsh [Wel98]. Schneier’s
book [Sch96] provides a very comprehensive collection of literally all notions and
concepts known in cryptography, which naturally means that the single notions
and concepts cannot be treated in mathematical detail there, but the interested
reader is referred to an extraordinarily large bibliography for such an in-depth
treatment. Singh [Sin99] wrote a very charming, easy-to-read, interesting book
about the history of cryptography from its ancient roots to its modern and even fu-
turistic branches such as quantum cryptography. An older but still valuable source
is Kahn’s book [Kah67]. We conclude this list, without claiming it to be com-
plete, with the books by Bauer [Bau00], Beutelspacher et al. [BSW01,Beu94], and
Buchmann [Buc01].
1. CRYPTOSYSTEMS AND PERFECT SECRECY
1.1 Classical Cryptosystems
The notion of a cryptosystem is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1.1 Cryptosystem.
—A cryptosystem is a quintuple (P , C,K, E ,D) such that:
(1) P , C, and K are finite sets, where
P is the plain text space or clear text space;
C is the cipher text space;
K is the key space.
Elements of P are referred to as plain text (or clear text), and elements of C
are referred to as cipher text. A message is a string of plain text symbols.
(2) E = {Ek | k ∈ K} is a family of functions Ek : P → C that are used for
encryption, and D = {Dk | k ∈ K} is a family of functions Dk : C → P that
are used for decryption.
(3) For each key e ∈ K, there exists a key d ∈ K such that for each p ∈ P :
Dd(Ee(p)) = p. (1.1)
—A cryptosystem is called symmetric (or “private-key”) if d = e, or if d can at
least be “easily” computed from e.
—A cryptosystem is called asymmetric (or “public-key”) if d 6= e, and it is “com-
putationally infeasible in practice” to compute d from e. Here, d is the private
key, and e is the public key.
At times, different key spaces are used for encryption and for decryption, which
results in a slight modification of the above definition.
We now present and discuss some examples of classical cryptosystems. Consider
the English alphabet Σ = {A,B, . . . ,Z}. To carry out the arithmetic modulo 26
with letters as if they were numbers, we identify Σ with Z26 = {0, 1, . . . , 25}; thus,
0 represents A and 1 represents B, and so on. This encoding of the plain text
alphabet by integers and the decoding of Z26 back to Σ is not part of the actual
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encryption and decryption, respectively. It will be used for the next three examples.
Note that messages are elements of Σ∗, where Σ∗ denotes the set of strings over Σ.
Example 1.2 Caesar cipher, a monoalphabetic symmetric cryptosystem.
Let K = Z26, and let P = C = Σ. The Caesar cipher encrypts messages by
shifting (modulo 26) each character of the plain text by the same number k of
letters in the alphabet, where k is the key. Shifting each character of the cipher
text back using the same key k reveals the original message:
—For each e ∈ Z26, define the encryption function Ee : Σ→ Σ by
Ee(p) = (p+ e) mod 26,
where addition with e modulo 26 is carried out character-wise, i.e., each character
mi ∈ Σ of a message m ∈ Σ∗ is shifted by e positions to mi + e mod 26. For
example, using the key e = 11 = L, the message “SUMMER” will be encrypted
as “DFXXPC.”
—For each d ∈ Z26, define the decryption function Dd : Σ→ Σ by
Dd(c) = (c− d) mod 26,
where subtraction by e modulo 26 again is carried out character-wise. Hence,
d = e. For example, decrypting the cipher text “DNSZZW” with the key d = 11
reveals the plain text “SCHOOL.”
Since the key space is very small, breaking the Caesar cipher is very easy. It is
vulnerable even to “cipher-text-only attacks,” i.e., an attacker given enough cipher
text c can easily check the 26 possible keys to see which one yields a meaningful
plain text. Note that the given cipher text should contain enough letters to enable
a unique decryption.
The Caesar cipher is a monoalphabetic cryptosystem, since it replaces each given
plain text letter, wherever in the message it occurs, by the same letter of the cipher
text alphabet. In contrast, the French cryptographer and diplomat Blaise de Vi-
gene`re (1523–1596) proposed a polyalphabetic cryptosystem, which is much harder
to break. Vigene`re’s system builds on earlier work by the Italian mathematician
Leon Battista Alberti (born in 1404), the German abbot Johannes Trithemius (born
in 1492), and the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta (born in 1535), see [Sin99]. It
works like the Caesar cipher, except that the cipher text letter encrypting any given
plain text letter X varies with the position of X in the plain text.
More precisely, one uses for encryption and decryption a Vigene`re square, which
consists of 26 rows with 26 columns each. Every row contains the 26 letters of
the alphabet, shifted by one from row to row, i.e., the rows and columns may
be viewed as a Caesar encryption of the English alphabet with keys 0, 1, . . ., 25.
Given a message m ∈ Σ∗, one first chooses a key k ∈ Σ∗, which is written above
the message m, symbol by symbol, possibly repeating k if k is shorter than m until
every character of m has a symbol above it. Denoting the ith letter of any string w
by wi, each letter mi of m is then encrypted as in the Caesar cipher, using the row
of the Vigene`re square that starts with ki, where ki is the key letter right abovemi.
Below, we describe the Vigene`re system formally and give an example of a concrete
encryption.
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Example 1.3 Vigene`re cipher, a polyalphabetic symmetric cryptosystem.
For fixed n ∈ N, let K = P = C = Zn26. Messages m ∈ Σ∗, where Σ again is the
English alphabet, are split into blocks of length n and are encrypted block-wise.
The Vigene`re cipher is defined as follows.
—For each e ∈ Zn26, define the encryption function Ee : Zn26 → Zn26 by
Ee(p) = (p+ e) mod 26,
where addition with e modulo 26 is carried out character-wise, i.e., each character
pi ∈ Σ of a plain text p ∈ P is shifted by ei positions to pi + ei mod 26.
—For each d ∈ Zn26, define the decryption function Dd : Zn26 → Zn26 by
Dd(c) = (c− d) mod 26,
where subtraction modulo 26 again is carried out character-wise. As in the Caesar
cipher, d = e.
For example, choose the word k = ENGLISH to be the key. Suppose we want to
encrypt the message m = FINNISHISALLGREEKTOGERMANS,1 omitting the
spaces between words. Table I shows how each plain text letter is encrypted, yield-
ing the cipher text c. For instance, the first letter of the message, “F,” corresponds
to the first letter of the key, “E.” Hence, the intersection of the “F”-column with
the “E”-row of the Vigene`re square gives the first letter, “J,” of the cipher text.
k E N G L I S H E N G L I S H E N G L I S H E N G L I
m F I N N I S H I S A L L G R E E K T O G E R M A N S
c J V T Y Q K O M F G W T Y Y I R Q E W Y L V Z G Y A
Table I. An example of encryption by the Vigene`re cipher.
Our last example of a classical, historically important cryptosystem is the Hill
cipher, which was invented by Lester Hill in 1929. It is based on linear algebra and,
like the Vigene`re cipher, is an affine linear block cipher.
Example 1.4 Hill cipher, a symmetric cryptosystem and a linear block cipher.
For fixed n ∈ N, the key space K is the set of all invertible n × n matrices in
Z
n×n
26 . Again, P = C = Zn26 and messages m ∈ Σ∗ are split into blocks of length n
and are encrypted block-wise. All arithmetic operations are carried out modulo 26.
The Hill cipher is defined as follows.
—For each K ∈ K, define the encryption function EK : Zn26 → Zn26 by
EK(p) = K · p mod 26,
where · denotes matrix multiplication modulo 26.
1From this example we not only learn how the Vigene`re cipher works, but also that using a
language such as Finnish, which is not widely used, often makes illegal decryption harder, and
thus results in a higher level of security. This is not a purely theoretical observation. During
World War II, the US Navy transmitted important messages using the language of the Navajos,
a Native American tribe. The “Navajo Code” was never broken by the Japanese code-breakers,
see [Sin99].
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—Letting K−1 denote the inverse matrix of K, the decryption function DK−1 :
Z
n
26 → Zn26 is defined by
DK−1(c) = K
−1 · c mod 26.
Since K−1 can easily be computed from K, the Hill cipher is a symmetric cryp-
tosystem. It is also the most general linear block cipher.
Concrete examples of messages encrypted by the Hill cipher can be found in,
e.g., [Sal96].
Affine linear block ciphers are easy to break by “known-plain-text attacks,” i.e., for
an attacker who knows some sample plain texts with the corresponding encryptions,
it is not too hard to find the key used to encrypt these plain texts. They are even
more vulnerable to “chosen-plain-text attacks,” where the attacker can choose some
pairs of corresponding plain texts and encryptions, which may be useful if there are
reasonable conjectures about the key used.
The method of frequency counts is often useful for decrypting messages. It ex-
ploits the redundancy of the natural language used for plain text messages. For
example, in many languages the letter “E” occurs, statistically significant, most
frequently, with a percentage of 12.31% in English, of 15.87% in French, and even
of 18.46% in German, see [Sal96]. Some languages have other letters that occur
with the highest frequency; for example, “A” is the most frequent letter in average
Finnish texts, with a percentage of 12.06% [Sal96].
In 1863, the German cryptanalyst Friedrich Wilhelm Kasiski found a method
to break the Vigene`re cipher. Singh [Sin99] attributes this achievement also to an
unpublished work, done probably around 1854, by the British genius and eccen-
tric Charles Babbage. The books by Salomaa [Sal96] and Singh [Sin99] describe
Kasiski’s and Babbage’s method. It marks a breakthrough in the history of crypt-
analysis, because previously the Vigene`re cipher was considered unbreakable. In
particular, like similar periodic cryptosystems with an unknown period, the Vi-
gene`re cipher appeared to resist cryptanalysis by counting and analysing the fre-
quency of letters in the cipher text. Kasiski showed how to determine the period
from repetitions of the same substring in the cipher text.
In light of Kasiski’s and Babbage’s achievement, it is natural to ask whether there
exist any cryptosystems that guarantee perfect secrecy. We turn to this question
in the next section that describes some of the pioneering work of Claude Shan-
non [Sha49], who laid the foundations of modern coding and information theory.
1.2 Conditional Probability and Bayes’s Theorem
To discuss perfect secrecy of cryptosystems in mathematical terms, we first need
some preliminaries from elementary probability theory.
Definition 1.5. Let A and B be events with Pr(B) > 0.
—The probability that A occurs under the condition that B occurs is defined by
Pr(A |B) = Pr(A ∩B)
Pr(B)
.
—A and B are independent if Pr(A∩B) = Pr(A) Pr(B) (equivalently, if Pr(A |B) =
Pr(A)).
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Lemma 1.6 Bayes’s Theorem. Let A and B be events with Pr(A) > 0 and
Pr(B) > 0. Then,
Pr(B) Pr(A |B) = Pr(A) Pr(B |A).
Proof. By definition,
Pr(B) Pr(A |B) = Pr(A ∩B) = Pr(B ∩A) = Pr(A) Pr(B |A).
1.3 Perfect Secrecy: Shannon’s Theorem
Consider the following scenario:
Erich
Using a cryptosystem (P , C,K, E ,D), Alice and Bob are communicating over an
insecure channel in the presence of eavesdropper Erich. Recall that P , C, and K are
finite sets. Erich reads a cipher text, c ∈ C, and tries to get some information about
the corresponding plain text, p ∈ P . The plain texts are distributed on P according
to a probability distribution PrP that may depend on the language used. For each
new plain text, Alice chooses a new key from K that is independent of the plain text
to be encrypted. The keys are distributed according to a probability distribution
PrK on K. The distributions PrP and PrK induce a probability distribution Pr =
PrP×K on P ×K. Thus, for each plain text p and each key k,
Pr(p, k) = PrP(p) PrK(k)
is the probability that the plain text p is encrypted with the key k, where p and k
are independent.
Pr(p) = PrP(p) is the probability that the plain text p will be encrypted. Simi-
larly, Pr(k) = PrK(k) is the probability that the key k will be used. Let c be an-
other random variable whose distribution is determined by the system used. Then,
Pr(p | c) is the probability that p is encrypted under the condition that c is received.
Erich knows the cipher text c, and he knows the probability distribution PrP , since
he knows the language used by Alice and Bob.
Definition 1.7. A cryptosystem (P , C,K, E ,D) provides perfect secrecy if and
only if
(∀p ∈ P) (∀c ∈ C) [Pr(p | c) = Pr(p)].
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That is, a cryptosystem achieves perfect secrecy if the event that some plain text p
is encrypted and the event that some cipher text c is received are independent: Erich
learns nothing about p from knowing c. The following example of a cryptosystem
that does not provide perfect secrecy is due to Buchmann [Buc01].
Example 1.8 Perfect secrecy. Let P , C, and K be given such that:
—P = {0, 1}, where Pr(0) = 14 and Pr(1) = 34 ;
—K = {A,B}, where Pr(A) = 14 and Pr(B) = 34 ;
—C = {a, b}.
It follows that, for example, the probability that a “1” occurs and is encrypted
with the key B is:
Pr(1, B) = Pr(1) · Pr(B) = 3
4
· 3
4
=
9
16
.
Let the encryption functions be given by:
EA(0) = a; EA(1) = b; EB(0) = b; EB(1) = a.
Hence, the probability that the cipher text a occurs is:
Pr(a) = Pr(0, A) + Pr(1, B) =
1
16
+
9
16
=
5
8
.
Similarly, the probability that the cipher text b occurs is:
Pr(b) = Pr(1, A) + Pr(0, B) =
3
16
+
3
16
=
3
8
.
Then, for each pair (p, c) ∈ P × C, the conditional probability Pr(p | c) is:
Pr(0 | a) = Pr(0, A)
Pr(a)
=
1
16
5
8
=
1
10
; Pr(0 | b) = Pr(0, B)
Pr(b)
=
3
16
3
8
=
1
2
;
Pr(1 | a) = Pr(1, B)
Pr(a)
=
9
16
5
8
=
9
10
; Pr(1 | b) = Pr(1, A)
Pr(b)
=
3
16
3
8
=
1
2
.
In particular, it follows that
Pr(0) =
1
4
6= 1
10
= Pr(0 | a),
and thus the given cryptosystem does not provide perfect secrecy: If Erich sees the
cipher text a, he can be pretty sure that the encrypted plain text was a “1.”
Theorem 1.9 Shannon [Sha49]. Let S = (P , C,K, E ,D) be a cryptosystem
with ||C|| = ||K|| and Pr(p) > 0 for each p ∈ P. Then, S provides perfect se-
crecy if and only if
(1) PrK is the uniform distribution, and
(2) for each p ∈ P and for each c ∈ C, there exists a unique key k ∈ K with
Ek(p) = c.
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Proof. Assume that S provides perfect secrecy. We show that the conditions (1)
and (2) hold.
Condition (2): Fix a plain text p ∈ P . Suppose that there is a cipher text c ∈ C
such that for all k ∈ K, it holds that Ek(p) 6= c. Thus,
Pr(p) 6= 0 = Pr(p | c),
which implies that S does not provide perfect secrecy, a contradiction. Hence,
(∀c ∈ C) (∃k ∈ K) [Ek(p) = c].
Now, ||C|| = ||K|| implies that each cipher text c ∈ C has a unique key k with
Ek(p) = c.
Condition (1): Fix a cipher text c ∈ C. For p ∈ P , let k(p) be the unique key k
with Ek(p) = c. By Bayes’s theorem, for each p ∈ P , we have:
Pr(p | c) = Pr(c | p) Pr(p)
Pr(c)
=
Pr(k(p)) Pr(p)
Pr(c)
. (1.2)
Since S provides perfect secrecy, we have Pr(p | c) = Pr(p). By Equation (1.2), this
implies Pr(k(p)) = Pr(c), and this equality holds independently of p.
Hence, the probabilities Pr(k) are equal for all k ∈ K, which implies Pr(k) = 1||K|| .
Thus, PrK is the uniform distribution.
Conversely, suppose that conditions (1) and (2) hold. We show that S provides
perfect secrecy. Let k = k(p, c) be the unique key k with Ek(p) = c. By Bayes’s
theorem, it follows that
Pr(p | c) = Pr(p) Pr(c | p)
Pr(c)
=
Pr(p) Pr(k(p, c))∑
q∈P Pr(q) Pr(k(q, c))
. (1.3)
Since all keys are uniformly distributed, it follows that
Pr(k(p, c)) =
1
||K|| .
Moreover, we have that∑
q∈P
Pr(q) Pr(k(q, c)) =
∑
q∈P Pr(q)
||K|| =
1
||K|| .
Substituting this equality in Equation (1.3) gives:
Pr(p | c) = Pr(p).
Hence, S provides perfect secrecy.
1.4 Vernam’s One-Time Pad
The Vernam one-time pad is a symmetric cryptosystem that does provide perfect
secrecy. It was invented by Gilbert Vernam in 1917,2 and is defined as follows. Let
2Slightly differing from the system described here, Vernam’s actual invention was a system with
a finite period and hence did not provide perfect secrecy; see Kahn [Kah67] on this point.
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P = C = K = {0, 1}n for some n ∈ N. For k ∈ {0, 1}n, define
—the encryption function Ek : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n by
Ek(p) = p⊕ k mod 2 , and
—the decryption function Dk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n by
Dk(c) = c⊕ k mod 2,
where ⊕ denotes bit-wise addition modulo 2. The keys are uniformly distributed
on {0, 1}n. Note that for each plain text p a new key k is chosen from {0, 1}n.
By Shannon’s Theorem, the one-time pad provides perfect secrecy, since for each
plain text p ∈ P and for each cipher text c ∈ C, there exists a unique key k ∈ K
with c = p⊕ k, namely the string k = c⊕ p.
However, the one-time pad has major disadvantages that make it impractical to
use in most concrete scenarios: To obtain perfect secrecy, every key can be used only
once, and it must be at least as long as the plain text to be transmitted. Surely, since
for every communication a new secret key at least as long as the plain text must be
transmitted, this results in a vicious circle. Despite these drawbacks, for the perfect
secrecy it provides, the one-time pad has been used in real-world applications such
as, allegedly, the hotline between Moscow and Washington, see [Sim79, p. 316].
2. RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM
The RSA cryptosystem, named after its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman, is the first public-key cryptosystem [RSA78]. It is still widely
used in cryptographic applications today. Again, the scenario is that Alice and
Bob want to exchange messages over an insecure channel on which Erich is an
eavesdropper:
Erich
In order to describe how the RSA cryptosystem works, we first need some pre-
liminaries from elementary number theory.
2.1 Euler and Fermat’s Theorems
The greatest common divisor of two integers a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b). For
n ∈ N, define the set
Z
∗
n = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and gcd(i, n) = 1}.
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The Euler function φ is defined by φ(n) = ||Z∗n||. Note that Z∗n is a group (with
respect to multiplication) of order φ(n). The following useful properties of φ follow
from the definition:
—φ(m · n) = φ(m) · φ(n) for all m,n ∈ N with gcd(m,n) = 1, and
—φ(p) = p− 1 for all primes p.
We will specifically use that φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), where p and q are primes and
n = pq.
Euler’s Theorem below is a special case (for the group Z∗n) of Langrange’s
Theorem, which states that for each element g of a finite multiplicative group
G having order |G| and the neutral element 1, it holds that g|G| = 1.
Theorem 2.1 Euler. For each a ∈ Z∗n, aφ(n) ≡ 1 mod n.
The special case of Euler’s Theorem with n being a prime not dividing a is known
as Fermat’s Little Theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Fermat’s Little Theorem. If p is a prime and a ∈ Z∗p, then
ap−1 ≡ 1 mod p.
2.2 RSA
(1) Key generation:
(1) Bob chooses randomly two large primes p and q with p 6= q, and computes their
product n = pq.
(2) Bob chooses a number e ∈ N with
1 < e < φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1) and gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1. (2.4)
(3) Bob computes the unique number d satisfying
1 < d < φ(n) and e · d ≡ 1 mod φ(n). (2.5)
That is, d is the inverse of e modulo φ(n).
(4) The pair (n, e) is Bob’s public key, and d is Bob’s private key.
In order to generate two large primes (e.g., primes with 80 digits each) efficiently,
one can choose large numbers at random and test them for primality. Since by the
Prime Number Theorem, the number of primes not exceeding N is approximately
N
lnN , the odds of hitting a prime are good after a reasonably small number of
trials. To verify the primality of the number picked, one usually makes use of a
randomized polynomial-time primality test such as the Monte Carlo3 algorithm of
Rabin [Rab80] that is related to a deterministic algorithm due to Miller [Mil76];
their primality test is known as the Miller-Rabin test. An alternative, though less
popular Monte Carlo algorithm was proposed by Solovay and Strassen [SS77]. The
3A Monte Carlo algorithm is a randomized algorithm whose “yes” answers are reliable, while its
“no” answers may be erroneous with a certain error probability, or vice versa. The corresponding
complexity classes are called R and coR, respectively, see [Gil77]. In contrast, a Las Vegas algo-
rithm may for certain sequences of coin flips halt without giving an answer at all, but whenever it
gives an answer, this answer is correct. The corresponding class, ZPP = R∩ coR, was also defined
by Gill [Gil77].
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Euclid’s Algorithm (extended)
Input: Two integers, b0 and b1.
begin x0 := 1; y0 := 0; x1 := 0; y1 := 1; i := 1;
while bi does not divide bi−1 do
begin
qi :=
⌊
bi−1
bi
⌋
;
bi+1 := bi−1 − qi · bi;
xi+1 := xi−1 − qi · xi;
yi+1 := yi−1 − qi · yi;
i := i+ 1
end
begin output
b := bi; (∗ b = gcd(b0, b1) = 1 ∗)
x := xi;
y := yi (∗ y is the inverse of b1 mod b0 ∗)
end output
end
Fig. 1. The extended algorithm of Euclid.
reason why the Solovay-Strassen test is less popular than the Miller-Rabin test is
that it is less efficient and less accurate. These two primality tests, along with a
careful complexity analysis and the required number-theoretical background, can
be found in, e.g., the books by Stinson [Sti95] and Salomaa [Sal96]. Additional
primality tests are contained in [Gol01b,Buc01].
Note Added in Proof : Quite recently, Agrawal et al. [AKS02] designed
a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for primality. Their break-
through result is a milestone in complexity theory and solves a long-
standing open problem. It is unlikely, though, that this algorithm
will have immediate consequences for cryptographic applications, since
Agrawal et al. [AKS02] note that their algorithm has a running time of
roughly n12 and thus is much less efficient than the probabilistic primal-
ity tests currently in use.
We now argue that the keys can be computed efficiently. In particular, the
inverse d of e modulo φ(n) can be computed efficiently via the extended algorithm
of Euclid; see Figure 1.
Lemma 2.3. On input b0 = φ(n) and b1 = e, the extended algorithm of Euclid
computes in polynomial time integers x and y such that
x · φ(n) + y · e ≡ 1 mod φ(n).
Thus, y is the inverse of e modulo φ(n), and Bob chooses d ≡ y mod φ(n) as his
private key.
Example 2.4. Bob chooses the primes p = 11 and q = 23, and computes their
product n = 253 and φ(253) = 10 · 22 = 220. The smallest possible e satisfying
Equation (2.4) is e = 3. The extended algorithm of Euclid yields the following
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sequence of bi, xi, and yi:
i bi xi yi qi
0 220 1 0 –
1 3 0 1 73
2 1 1 −73 –
Since 1 ·220+(−73)·3 = 220−219 ≡ 1 mod 220, the unique value d = −73+220 =
147 computed by Bob satisfies Equation (2.5) and is the inverse of e = 3 modulo 220.
(2) Encryption: We assume that messages over some alphabet Σ are block-wise
encoded as positive integers with a fixed block length. Suppose that m < n is
the message Alice wants to send to Bob. Alice knows Bob’s public key (n, e) and
computes the encryption c = E(n,e)(m) of m, where the encryption function is
defined by
E(n,e)(m) = m
e mod n.
Performed naively, this computation may require a large number of multiplica-
tions, depending on the choice of e. To ensure efficient encryption, we will employ a
“fast exponentiation” algorithm called “square-and-multiply,” see Figure 2 below.
Square-and-Multiply Algorithm
Input: m,n, e ∈ N, where m < n.
Step 1. Let the binary expansion of the exponent e be given by
e =
k∑
i=0
ei2
i, where ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Step 2. Successively compute m2
i
, where 0 ≤ i ≤ k, using the equality
m2
i+1
=
(
m2
i
)2
.
It is not necessary to store the intermediate values of m2
i
.
Step 3. In the arithmetic modulo n, compute
me =
k∏
i = 0
ei=1
m2
i
. (2.6)
Output: me.
Fig. 2. The square-and-multiply algorithm.
Equation (2.6) in Step 3 of Figure 2 is correct, since
me = m
∑k
i=0
ei2
i
=
k∏
i=0
(
m2
i
)ei
=
k∏
i = 0
ei=1
m2
i
.
Hence, instead of e multiplications, Alice need compute no more than 2 log e
multiplications. Thus, the square-and-multiply method speeds up the encryption
exponentially.
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Example 2.5. Suppose Alice wants to compute c = 617 mod 100. The binary
expansion of the exponent is 17 = 1 + 16 = 20 + 24.
(1) Alice successively computes:
62
0
= 61 = 6;
62
1
= 62 = 36;
62
2
= 362 ≡ −4 mod 100;
62
3 ≡ (−4)2 mod 100 ≡ 16 mod 100;
62
4 ≡ 162 mod 100 ≡ 56 mod 100.
(2) Alice computes her cipher text
c = 617 mod 100 ≡ 6 · 624 mod 100
≡ 6 · 56 mod 100
≡ 36 mod 100.
Note that only four squarings and one multiplication are needed for her to
compute the cipher text.
(3) Decryption: Let c, 0 ≤ c < n, be the cipher text sent to Bob; c is subject to
eavesdropping by Erich. Bob decrypts c using his private key d and the following
decryption function:
Dd(c) = c
d mod n.
Again, the fast exponentiation algorithm described in Figure 2 ensures that the
legal recipient Bob can decrypt the cipher text efficiently. Thus, the RSA protocol
is feasible. To prove that it is correct, we show that Equation (1.1) is satisfied.
Step
1 chooses large primes p, q at random, com-
putes n = pq and φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1), his
public key (n, e) with e satisfying Eq. (2.4),
and his private key d satisfying Eq. (2.5)
2
(n, e)⇐
3 encrypts message m by
computing
c = me mod n
4
c⇒
5 decrypts cipher text c by computing
m = cd = (me)d mod n
Fig. 3. The RSA protocol.
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Figure 3 summarizes the single steps of the RSA protocol and displays the in-
formation communicated by Alice and Bob that is subject to eavesdropping by
Erich.
Theorem 2.6. Let (n, e) and d be Bob’s public and private key in the RSA
protocol. Then, for each message m with 0 ≤ m < n,
m = (me)
d
mod n.
That is, RSA is a public-key cryptosystem.
Proof. Since e · d ≡ 1 mod φ(n) by Equation (2.5), there exists an integer t
such that
e · d = 1 + t(p− 1)(q − 1),
where n = pq. It follows that
(me)
d
= me·d = m1+t(p−1)(q−1)
= m
(
mt(p−1)(q−1)
)
= m
(
mp−1
)t(q−1)
.
Hence, we have
(me)
d ≡ m mod p, (2.7)
since if p divides m then both sides of Equation (2.7) are 0 mod p, and if p does
not divide m (i.e., gcd(p,m) = 1) then by Fermat’s Little Theorem, we have
mp−1 ≡ 1 mod p.
By a symmetric argument, it holds that
(me)
d ≡ m mod q.
Since p and q are primes with p 6= q, it follows from the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(see, e.g., [Knu81] or [Sti95]) that
(me)
d ≡ m mod n.
Since m < n, the claim follows.
2.3 RSA Digital Signature Protocol
The RSA public-key cryptosystem described in Section 2.2 can be modified so as
to yield a digital signature protocol. Figure 4 shows how the RSA digital signature
protocol works. A chosen-plain-text attack on the RSA digital signature scheme,
and countermeasures to avoid it, are described in Section 2.4.
2.4 Security of RSA and Possible Attacks on RSA
The security of the RSA cryptosystem strongly depends on whether factoring large
integers is intractable. It is widely believed that there is no efficient factoring
algorithm, since no such algorithm could be designed as yet, despite considerable
efforts in the past. However, it is not known whether the problem of factoring large
integers is as hard as the problem of cracking the RSA system.
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Step
1 chooses n = pq, her public key
(n, e), and her private key d as
in the RSA protocol, see Sec-
tion 2.2
2 computes her signature
sigA(m) = m
d mod n
for the message m
3
m, sigA(m)⇒
4 verifies Alice’s signature by
checking the congruence
m ≡ (sigA(m))
e mod n
Fig. 4. The RSA digital signature protocol.
Here is a list of potential attacks on the RSA system. To preclude these direct
attacks, some care must be taken in choosing the primes p and q, the modulus n,
the exponent e, and the private key d. For further background on the security
of the RSA system and on proposed attacks to break it, the reader is referred
to [Bon99,Sha95,KR95,Moo92]. For each attack on RSA that has been proposed in
the literature to date, some practical countermeasures are known, rules of thumb
that prevent the success of those attacks or, at least, that make their likelihood of
success negligibly small.
Factoring attacks:. The aim of the attacker Erich is to use the public key (n, e)
to recover the private key d by factoring n, i.e., by computing the primes p and q
with n = pq. Knowing p and q, he can just like Bob compute φ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1)
and thus the inverse d of e modulo φ(n), using the extended algorithm of Euclid;
see Figure 1 and Lemma 2.3. There are various ways in which Erich might mount
this type of attack on RSA.
—Brute-force attack : Erich might try to factor the modulus n simply by exhaustive
search of the complete key space. Choosing n sufficiently large will prevent this
type of attack. Currently, it is recommended to use moduli n with at least 768
bits, i.e., the size of 512 bits formerly in use no longer provides adequate pro-
tection today. Of course, the time complexity of modular exponentiation grows
rapidly with the modulus size, and thus there is a tradeoff between increasing
the security of RSA and decreasing its efficiency.
It is also generally accepted that those moduli n consisting of prime factors p
and q of roughly the same size are the hardest to factor.
—General-purpose factoring methods : Examples of such general factoring algo-
rithms are the general number field sieve (see, e.g., [LL93]) or the older quadratic
sieve (see, e.g., [Buc01,Sti95]). They are based on the following simple idea.
Suppose n is the number to be factorized. Using the respective “sieve,” one
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determines integers a and b such that
a2 ≡ b2 mod n and a 6≡ ±b mod n. (2.8)
Thus, n divides a2−b2 = (a−b)(a+b), but neither a−b nor a+b. Hence, gcd(a−
b, n) is a nontrivial factor of n. The general number field sieve and the quadratic
sieve differ in the specific way the integers a and b satisfying Equation (2.8) are
found.
—Special-purpose factoring methods : Depending on the form of the primes p and q,
it might be argued that using special-purpose factoring methods such as Pollard’s
“p − 1 method” [Pol74] may be more effective and more successful than using
general-purpose factoring methods. This potential threat led to the introduction
of strong primes that resist such special-purpose factoring methods. A strong
prime p is required to satisfy certain conditions such as that p − 1 has a large
factor r and r − 1, in turn, has a large factor, etc.
—Elliptic curve method : This factoring method was introduced by Lenstra [Len87],
and it has some success probability regardless of the form of the primes cho-
sen. Consequently, the most effective countermeasure against the elliptic curve
method is to use primes of very large size. This countermeasure simultaneously
provides, with a very high probability, protection against all known types of
special-purpose factoring methods. In short, randomly chosen large primes are
more important than strong primes. Note that weak primes are believed to be
rare; Pomerance and Sorenson [PS95] study the density of weak primes.
—Factoring on a quantum computer : Last, we mention that Shor’s algorithm for
factoring large numbers on a quantum computer [Sho97] poses a potential threat
to the security of RSA and other cryptosystems whose security relies on the
hardness of the factoring problem. More precisely, Shor’s efficient quantum algo-
rithm determines the order of a given group element, a problem closely related
to the factoring problem. Using Miller’s randomized reduction [Mil76], if one
can efficiently compute the order of group elements, then one can efficiently solve
the factoring problem. However, the quantum computer is a theoretical construct
currently. Whether or not Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm will be a practical
threat remains to be seen in the future.
Superencryption:. Early on Simmons and Norris [SN77] proposed an attack on
RSA called superencryption. This attack is based on the observation that a suffi-
cient number of encryptions will eventually recover the original message, since the
RSA encryption function is an injective mapping onto a finite set, which makes the
graph of the function a union of disjoint cycles. This attack is a threat to the se-
curity of RSA, provided that the number of encryptions required is small. Luckily,
superencryption is not a practical attack if the primes are large and are chosen at
random.
Wiener’s attack:. Wiener [Wie90] proposed an attack on the RSA system by a
continued fraction approximation, using the public key (n, e) to provide sufficient
information to recover the private key d. More precisely, Wiener proved that if
the keys in the RSA system are chosen such that n = pq, where q < p < 2q, and
d < 13
4
√
n, then given the public key (n, e) with ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n) the private key
d can be computed in linear time.
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Here is a proof sketch of Wiener’s result (see [Bon99]). Since ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n),
there exists a k such that ed−kφ(n) = 1, which implies that k
d
is an approximation
of e
φ(n) : ∣∣∣∣ eφ(n) − kd
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ 1dφ(n)
∣∣∣∣ . (2.9)
Erich does not know φ(n), but he can use n in place of φ(n). Using ed− kφ(n) = 1
and the easily verified fact that |n − φ(n)| < 3√n, in place of Equation (2.9) we
now have ∣∣∣∣ en − kd
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣1− k(n− φ(n))dn
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣3k
√
n
dn
∣∣∣∣ = 3kd√n.
Since kφ(n) = ed− 1 < ed and e < φ(n), we have k < d < 13 4
√
n. Hence,∣∣∣∣ en − kd
∣∣∣∣ < 1d 4√n < 12d2 .
There are at most logn fractions k
d
with d < n approximating e
n
so tightly, and
they can be obtained by computing the logn convergents of the continued fraction
expansion of e
n
(see [HW79, Thm. 177]). Since ed−kφ(n) = 1, we have gcd(k, d) =
1, so k
d
is a reduced fraction.
Note that this attack is efficient and practical, and thus is a concern, only if the
private key d is chosen to be small relative to n. For example, if n is a 1024 bits
number, then d must be at least 256 bits long in order to prevent Wiener’s attack.
A small value of d, however, enables fast decryption and in particular is desirable
for low-power devices such as “smartcards.” Therefore, Wiener proposed certain
techniques that avoid his attack.
The first technique is to use a large encryption exponent, say e˜ = e + ℓφ(n) for
some large ℓ. For a large enough e˜, the factor k in the above proof is so large that
Wiener’s attack cannot be mounted, regardless of how small d is.
The second technique uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up decryp-
tion, even if d is not small. Let d be a large decryption exponent such that both
dp ≡ d mod p − 1 and dq ≡ d mod q − 1 are small. Then, one can decrypt a
given cipher text c as follows. Compute mp = c
dp mod p and mq = c
dq mod q,
and use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain the unique solution m modulo
n = pq of the two equations m = mp mod p and m = mq mod q. The point is
that although dp and dq are small, d can be chosen large enough to resist Wiener’s
attack.
Boneh and Durfee [BD00] recently improved Wiener’s result: Erich can efficiently
compute d from (n, e) provided that d < n0.292.
Small-message attack:. RSA encryption is not effective if both the message m to
be encrypted and the exponent e to be used for encryption are small relative to the
modulus n. In particular, if c = me < n is the cipher text, then m can be recovered
from c by ordinary root extraction. Thus, either the public exponent should be
large or the messages should always be large. It is this latter suggestion that is
more useful, for a small public exponent is often preferred in order to speed up the
encryption and to preclude Wiener’s attack.
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Low-exponent attack:. One should take precautions, though, not to choose the
public exponent too small. A preferred value of e that has been used often in the
past is e = 3. However, if three parties participating in the same system encrypt
the same message m using the same public exponent 3, although perhaps different
moduli n1, n2, and n3, then one can easily compute m from the three cipher texts:
c1 = m
3 mod n1
c2 = m
3 mod n2
c3 = m
3 mod n3.
In particular, the message m must be smaller than the moduli, and so m3 will be
smaller than n1n2n3. Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see, e.g., [Knu81,
Sti95]), one can compute the unique solution
c = m3 mod n1n2n3 = m
3.
Hence, one can compute m from c by ordinary root extraction.
More generally, suppose that k related plain texts are encrypted with the same
exponent e:
c1 = (a1m+ b1)
e mod n1
c2 = (a2m+ b2)
e mod n2
...
ck = (akm+ bk)
e mod nk,
where ai and bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are known and k > e(e+1)2 and min(ni) > 2e
2
. Then, an
attacker can solve form in polynomial time using lattice reduction techniques. This
observation is due to Johan H˚astad [H˚as88], and his “broadcast attack” has been
strengthened by Don Coppersmith [Cop97]. This attack is a concern if the messages
are related in a known way. Padding the messages with pseudorandom strings prior
to encryption prevents mounting this attack in practice, see, e.g., [KR95]. If the
messages are related in a known way, they should not be encrypted with many RSA
keys.
A recommended value of e that is commonly used today is e = 216 + 1. One
advantage of this value for e is that its binary expansion has only two ones, which
implies that the square-and-multiply algorithm of Figure 2 requires very few oper-
ations,4 and so is very efficient.
Forging RSA signatures:. This attack is based on the fact that the RSA encryp-
tion function is a homomorphism: if (n, e) is the public key and m1 and m2 are
two messages then
me1 ·me2 ≡ (m1 ·m2)e mod n. (2.10)
Another identity that can easily be verified is:
(m · re)d ≡ md · r mod n. (2.11)
4How many exactly?
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In particular, these identities can be used to mount an attack on the digital signature
scheme based on the RSA algorithm, see Figure 4 and Section 2.3. Given previous
message-signature pairs (m1, sigA(m1)), . . . , (mk, sigA(mk)), Erich can use the con-
gruences (2.10) and (2.11) to compute a new message-signature pair (m, sigA(m))
by
m = re
k∏
i=1
meii mod n;
sigA(m) = r
k∏
i=1
(sigA(mi))
ei mod n,
where r and the ei are arbitrary. Hence, Erich can forge Alice’s signature without
knowing her private key, and Bob will not detect the forgery, since m ≡ (sigA(m))e
mod n. Note that, in Equation (2.10), even if m1 and m2 are meaningful plain
texts, m1 · m2 usually is not. Thus, Erich can forge Alice’s signature only for
messages that may or may not be useful. However, he might choose the messages
mi so as to generate a meaningful message m with a forged digital signature. This
chosen-plain-text attack can again be avoided by pseudorandom padding techniques
that destroy the algebraic relations between messages. Pseudorandom padding is
also a useful countermeasure against the following chosen-cipher-text attack : Erich
intercepts some cipher text c, chooses r ∈ N at random, and computes c ·re mod n,
which he sends to the legitimate receiver Bob. By Equation (2.11), Bob will decrypt
the string cˆ = cd · r mod n, which is likely to look like a random string. Erich,
however, if he were to get his hands on cˆ, could obtain the original message m by
multiplying by r−1, the inverse of r modulo n, i.e., by computing m = r−1 · cd · r
mod n.
3. PROTOCOLS FOR SECRET-KEY AGREEMENT, PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION,
AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Consider again a scenario where Alice and Bob want to exchange messages over an
insecure channel such as a public telephone line, and where Erich is an eavesdropper:
Erich
This is why Alice and Bob want to encrypt their messages. For efficiency purposes,
they decide to use a symmetric cryptosystem in which they both possess the same
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key for encryption and for decryption; recall Definition 1.1. But then, how can
they agree on a joint secret key when they can communicate only over an insecure
channel? If they were to send an encrypted message containing the key to be used
in subsequent communications, which key should they use to encrypt this message?
This paradoxical situation is known as the secret-key agreement problem, and it
was considered to be unsolvable since the beginning of cryptography. It was quite
a surprise when in 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76] did solve
this long-standing, seemingly paradoxical problem by proposing the first secret-key
agreement protocol. We describe their protocol in Section 3.1. Interestingly, it was
the Diffie–Hellman protocol that inspired Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman to invent
the RSA system. That is, Diffie and Hellman’s key idea to solve the secret-key
agreement problem opened the door to modern public-key cryptography, which no
longer requires sending secret keys over insecure channels.
Strangely enough, the reverse happened in the nonpublic sector. The Com-
munications Electronics Security Group (CESG) of the British Government Com-
munications Head Quarters (GCHQ) claims to have invented the RSA public-key
cryptosystem prior to Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman and the Diffie–Hellman secret-
key agreement scheme independently of Diffie and Hellman. And they did so in
reverse order. James Ellis first discovered the principle possibility of public-key
cryptography in the late sixties. In 1973, Clifford Cocks developed the mathemat-
ics necessary to realize Ellis’s ideas and formulated what four years later became
known as the RSA system. Soon thereafter, inspired by Ellis’s and Cocks’s work,
Malcolm Williamson invented what became known as the Diffie–Hellman secret-key
agreement scheme, around the same time Diffie and Hellman succeeded. None of
the results of Ellis, Cocks, and Williamson became known to the public then. The
full story—or what of it is publicly known by now—is told in Singh’s book [Sin99].
Section 3.2 shows how to modify the Diffie–Hellman protocol in order to obtain
a public-key cryptosystem. This protocol is due to Taher ElGamal [ElG85]. Just
like the Diffie–Hellman protocol, ElGamal’s cryptosystem is based on the difficulty
of computing discrete logarithms.
Section 3.3 gives an interesting protocol due to an unpublished work of Adi
Shamir. In this protocol, keys do not need to be agreed upon prior to exchanging
encrypted messages.
Another cryptographic task is the generation of digital signatures : Alice wants
to sign her encrypted messages to Bob in a way that allows Bob to verify that Alice
was indeed the sender of the message. Digital signature protocols are used for the
authentication of documents such as email messages. The goal is to preclude Erich
from forging Alice’s messages and her signature. Digital signature protocols are
described in Section 2.3 (RSA digital signatures), in Section 3.2 (ElGamal digital
signatures) and in Section 3.4 (Rabi and Sherman digital signatures).
3.1 Diffie and Hellman’s Secret-Key Agreement Protocol
Figure 5 shows how the Diffie–Hellman secret-key agreement protocol works. It is
based on the modular exponential function with base g and modulus p, where p
is a prime and g is a primitive root of p in Z∗p, the cyclic group of prime residues
modulo p; recall that Z∗p has order φ(p) = p− 1. The formal definition is as follows.
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Step
1 Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p and a primitive root g of p;
p and g are public
2 chooses a large number a at
random, computes α = ga
mod p
chooses a large number b at
random, computes β = gb
mod p
3
α⇒
β⇐
4 computes her key
kA = β
a mod p
computes his key
kB = α
b mod p
Fig. 5. The Diffie–Hellman secret-key agreement protocol.
Definition 3.1. —For n ∈ N, a primitive root of n is any element a ∈ Z∗n satis-
fying that, for each d with 1 ≤ d < φ(n), it holds that
ad 6≡ 1 mod n.
Equivalently, a primitive root of n is a generator of Z∗n.
—Let p be a prime, and let g be a primitive root of p. The function α(g,p) : Zp−1 →
Z
∗
p that is defined by
α(g,p)(a) = g
a mod p.
is called the modular exponential function with base g and modulus p. Its inverse
function, which for fixed p and g maps α(g,p)(a) to a = logg α mod p, is called
the discrete logarithm.
As noted above, every primitive root of p generates the entire group Z∗p. More-
over, Z∗p has precisely φ(p − 1) primitive roots. For example, Z∗5 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
Z
∗
4 = {1, 3}, so φ(4) = 2, and the two primitive roots of 5 in Z∗5 are 2 and 3, since
21 = 2; 22 = 4; 23 ≡ 3 mod 5; 24 ≡ 1 mod 5;
31 = 3; 32 ≡ 4 mod 5; 33 ≡ 2 mod 5; 34 ≡ 1 mod 5.
Not every integer has a primitive root: 8 is the smallest such example. It is known
from elementary number theory that an integer n has a primitive root if and only
if n is 1 or 2 or 4, or is of the form qk or 2qk for some odd prime q.
The protocol from Figure 5 works, since
kA = β
a = gba = gab = αb = kB .
Thus, the keys computed by Alice and Bob indeed are the same.
Computing discrete logarithms is considered to be a very hard problem: no
efficient algorithms are known for solving it. In contrast, the modular exponen-
tial function can be computed efficiently, using the fast exponentiation algorithm
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“square-and-multiply” described as Figure 2. That is why modular exponentiation
is considered to be a candidate for a “one-way function,” i.e., a function that is easy
to compute but hard to invert. Things are bad. It is currently not known whether
or not one-way functions exist. Things are worse. Although they are not known to
exist, one-way functions play a key role in cryptography, and the security of many
cryptosystems is based on the assumption that one-way functions do exist. We will
discuss the notion of one-way functions in more detail in Section 5.
If Erich is listening carefully to Alice and Bob’s communication in the Diffie–
Hellman protocol (see Figure 5), he knows p, g, α, and β. He wants to compute
their joint secret key, kA = kB. This problem is known as the Diffie–Hellman
problem. If Erich could solve the discrete logarithm problem efficiently, he could
easily compute a = logg α mod p and b = logg β mod p and, thus, kA = β
a mod p
and kB = α
b mod p. That is, the Diffie–Hellman problem is no more difficult than
the discrete logarithm problem. The converse question—of whether the Diffie–
Hellman problem is as hard as the discrete logarithm problem—is still an unproven
conjecture. Fortunately, as noted above, the discrete logarithm problem is viewed
as being intractable, so this attack is very unlikely to be a practical threat. On the
other hand, it is the only known attack for computing the keys directly from α and
β in the Diffie–Hellman protocol. Note, however, that no proof of security for this
protocol has been established up to date.
Note also that computing the keys kA = kB directly from α and β is not the
only possible attack on the Diffie–Hellman protocol. For example, it is vulnerable
to the Man-in-the-middle attack. Unlike passive attacks against the underlying
mathematics of a cryptosystem, in which an eavesdropper tries to gain information
without affecting the protocol, the Man-in-the-middle attack is an active attack, in
which an eavesdropper attempts to alter the protocol to his own advantage. That is,
Erich, as the “man in the middle,” might pretend to be Alice when communicating
with Bob, and he might pretend to be Bob when communicating with Alice. He
could intercept α = ga mod p that Alice sends to Bob and he could also intercept
β = gb mod p that Bob sends to Alice, passing on his own values αE in place of α
to Bob and βE in place of β to Alice. That way Erich could compute two (possibly
distinct) keys, one for communicating with Alice, the other one for communicating
with Bob, without them having any clue that they in fact are communicating with
him. Thus, Alice and Bob cannot be certain of the authenticity of their respective
partners in the communication. In Section 4, we will introduce zero-knowledge
protocols, which can be used to ensure proper authentication.
By slightly modifying the Diffie–Hellman protocol, it is possible to obtain a
public-key cryptosystem. The variant of the Diffie–Hellman protocol presented
here in fact is a “hybrid cryptosystem,” a public-key cryptosystem making use of
a given symmetric cryptosystem. Such hybrid systems are often useful in prac-
tice, for they combine the advantages of asymmetric and symmetric cryptosystems.
Symmetric systems are usually more efficient than public-key systems.
The protocol works as follows. Alice and Bob agree on a large prime p and
a primitive root g of p, which are public. They also agree on some symmetric
cryptosystem S = (P , C,K, E ,D) with encryption functions E = {Ek | k ∈ K} and
decryption functions D = {Dk | k ∈ K}. The subsequent steps of the protocol
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Step
1 Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p and a primitive root g of p;
p and g are public
2 chooses a large number b at
random as his private key and
computes β = gb mod p
3
β⇐
4 chooses a large number a at
random, computes α = ga
mod p, the key k = βa mod p,
and the cipher text c = Ek(m),
where m is the message to be
sent
5
α, c⇒
6 computes k = αb mod p and
m = Dk(c)
Fig. 6. A public-key cryptosystem based on the Diffie–Hellman protocol, which uses the encryption
and decryption algorithms Ek and Dk of a given symmetric cryptosystem.
are shown in Figure 6. The message to be sent is encrypted using the symmetric
system S, and the symmetric key k used in this encryption is transmitted in a Diffie–
Hellman-like fashion. This modification of the original Diffie–Hellman protocol is
the standard usage of Diffie–Hellman.
The system in Figure 6 modifies the original Diffie–Hellman protocol in the fol-
lowing way. While in the Diffie–Hellman scheme Alice and Bob simultaneously
compute and send their “partial keys” α and β, respectively, they do so sequen-
tially in the protocol in Figure 6. That is, Alice must wait for Bob’s value β, his
public key, to be able to compute the key k with which she then encrypts her mes-
sage m via the symmetric cryptosystem S. Moreover, Bob generates, once and for
all, his public β for possibly several communications with Alice, and also for pos-
sibly several users other than Alice who might want to communicate with him. In
contrast, Alice has to generate her α anew again and again every time she communi-
cates with Bob, just like in the original Diffie–Hellman protocol. This modification
of Diffie–Hellman is usually referred to as Predistributed Diffie–Hellman. In a key
distribution scheme, one party chooses a key and then transmits it to another party
or parties over an insecure channel. In contrast, in a secret-key agreement scheme
such as the original Diffie–Hellman protocol from Figure 5, two or more parties
jointly compute, by communicating over an insecure channel, a shared secret key,
which depends on inputs from both or all parties.
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3.2 ElGamal’s Public-Key Cryptosystem and Digital Signature Protocol
Taher ElGamal [ElG85] developed a public-key cryptosystem and a digital signature
protocol that are based on the Diffie–Hellman protocol. In fact, the variant of Diffie–
Hellman presented in Figure 6 is somewhat reminiscent of the original ElGamal
public-key cryptosystem, which we will now describe.
Step
1 Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p and a primitive root g of p;
p and g are public
2 chooses b ∈ Z∗p−1 at random
and computes β = gb mod p;
b is private and β is public
3
β⇐
4 picks a secret a ∈ Z∗p−1 at ran-
dom, computes α = ga mod p
and c = mβa mod p, where m
is the message to be sent
5
α, c⇒
6 computes x = p − 1 − b and
decrypts by computing
m = cαx mod p
Fig. 7. The ElGamal public-key cryptosystem.
Figure 7 shows ElGamal’s public-key cryptosystem. After Alice and Bob have
agreed on a prime p and a primitive root g of p, Bob picks a random value b ∈ Z∗p−1
and computes his public key β = gb mod p. If Alice wants to send him a message
m ∈ Z∗p, she looks up β and “disguises” m by multiplying it with βa modulo p,
where a ∈ Z∗p−1 is a random number she has picked. This yields the first part c of
the cipher text, the second part is α = ga mod p. She sends both c and α to Bob.
To decrypt, Bob first computes x = p− 1 − b. Since 1 ≤ b ≤ p− 2, it follows that
1 ≤ x ≤ p− 2. Bob then can recover the original plain text m by computing:
cαx ≡ mβaga(p−1−b) ≡ mgba+a(p−1)−ab ≡ m (gp−1)a ≡ m mod p.
Just as in the Diffie–Hellman protocol, the security of the ElGamal protocol is
based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. Although it is not known
whether breaking the ElGamal protocol is as hard as solving the discrete logarithm
problem, it can be shown that breaking the ElGamal protocol is precisely as hard
as solving the Diffie–Hellman problem. To prevent known attacks on the ElGamal
cryptosystem, the prime p should be chosen large enough (at least 150 digits long)
and such that p− 1 has at least one large prime factor.
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Step
1 Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p and a primitive root g of p;
p and g are public
2 chooses b and β = gb mod p
as in Fig. 7; chooses a number
r with gcd(r, p − 1) = 1, com-
putes ρ = gr mod p and s ac-
cording to Eq. (3.12) and his
signature
sigB(m) = (ρ, s)
3
β, m, sigB(m)⇐
4 verifies Bob’s signature by
checking that Eq. (3.13) holds:
gm ≡ βρ · ρs mod p.
Fig. 8. The ElGamal digital signature protocol.
ElGamal’s system can be modified so as to yield a digital signature protocol. A
particularly efficient variant of this protocol that is due to an idea of Schnorr [Sch90]
is now the United States “Digital Signature Standard” [Nat91,Nat92].
The ElGamal digital signature protocol is presented in Figure 8. Suppose that
Bob wants to send a message m to Alice. To prove that he indeed is the sender,
he wants to sign the message in a way that Alice can verify. Let a large prime p
and a primitive root g of p be given as in the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem,
see Figure 7. As in that protocol, Bob chooses his private b and computes β = gb
mod p. In addition, he now chooses a number r coprime with p−1, and he computes
ρ = gr mod p and a solution s to the congruence
b · ρ+ r · s ≡ m mod p− 1 (3.12)
using the extended algorithm of Euclid, see Figure 1 and Lemma 2.3.
Bob keeps b and r secret, and he sends along with his message m his digital
signature sigB(m) = (ρ, s) and the value β to Alice.
Alice checks the validity of the signature by verifying the congruence
gm ≡ βρ · ρs mod p. (3.13)
The protocol is correct, since by Fermat’s Little Theorem (see Theorem 2.2) and
by Equation (3.12), it holds that
gm ≡ gb·ρ+r·s ≡ βρ · ρs mod p.
Note that the public verification key, which consists of the values p, g, and β, is
computed just once and can be used to verify any message that is signed with p, g,
b, and β. However, a new value of r is chosen every time a message is signed.
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3.3 Shamir’s No-Key Protocol
Step
1 Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p, which is public
2 computes x = ma mod p,
where m is the message
3
x⇒
4 computes y = xb mod p
5
y⇐
6 computes z = ya
−1
mod p
7
z⇒
8 computes m = zb
−1
mod p
Fig. 9. Shamir’s no-key protocol.
Adi Shamir proposed a cryptosystem by which Alice and Bob can exchange
messages that are encrypted by Alice’s and Bob’s individual secret keys, yet in
which there is no need for Alice and Bob to previously agree on a joint secret key.
This clever idea is described in an unpublished paper of Shamir, and it is again based
on the modular exponentiation function and the difficulty of efficiently computing
discrete logarithms that was useful for the Diffie–Hellman secret-key agreement
protocol described in Section 3.1. The Shamir protocol is often called Massey-
Omura in the literature. Both inventors were preceded by Malcolm Williamson
from GCHQ who developed the same protocol in the nonpublic sector around 1974.
Figure 9 shows how Shamir’s no-key protocol works. In this protocol, let m be
the message that Alice wants to send to Bob. First, Alice and Bob agree on a large
prime p. Alice generates a pair (a, a−1) satisfying
aa−1 ≡ 1 mod p− 1,
where a−1 is the inverse of a modulo p − 1. Recall from Section 2.2 that, given a
prime p and an integer a ∈ Z∗p, the inverse a−1 of a modulo p − 1 can easily be
computed. Similarly, Bob generates a pair (b, b−1) satisfying
bb−1 ≡ 1 mod p− 1,
where b−1 is the inverse of b modulo p− 1. See Figure 9 for the rest of the steps.
The protocol is correct, since for all messages m, 1 ≤ m ≤ p, it holds that:
m ≡ maa−1 mod p and m ≡ mbb−1 mod p.
Hence, looking at Figure 9, we obtain
zb
−1 ≡ ya−1b−1 ≡ xba−1b−1 ≡ maba−1b−1 ≡ m mod p,
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so Step 8 of Figure 9 is correct.
Note that modular exponentiation is used here both for encryption and decryp-
tion. The key property for this protocol to work is that modular exponentiation is
symmetric in the exponents, i.e., for all a and b, it holds that
α(g,p)(a · b) ≡ ga·b ≡ gb·a mod p.
3.4 Rivest, Rabi, and Sherman’s Secret-Key Agreement and Digital Signature Proto-
cols
Ron Rivest, Muhammad Rabi, and Alan Sherman developed secret-key agreement
and digital signature protocols. The secret-key agreement protocol from Figure 10
is attributed to Rivest and Sherman in [RS93,RS97]. The digital signature protocol
from Figure 11 is due to Rabi and Sherman [RS93,RS97].
Here is a brief, intuitive explanation of how these protocols work. The key
building block of both protocols is a total, strongly noninvertible, associative one-
way function. As mentioned earlier, one-way functions are theoretical constructs
not known to exist. However, there are plausible assumptions under which one-way
functions of various types can be constructed. In Section 5, under a quite plausible
complexity-theoretic assumption, we will see how to construct a concrete candidate
for a total, strongly noninvertible, associative one-way function. For now, assume
that σ is such a function. That is, σ is a total two-ary (i.e., two-argument) function
mapping pairs of positive integers to positive integers such that:
—σ is associative, i.e., the equation σ(x, σ(y, z)) = σ(σ(x, y), z) holds for all x, y, z ∈
N.
—σ is strongly noninvertible, i.e., σ is hard to invert even if in addition to the
function value one of the arguments is given.
Look at Rivest and Sherman’s secret-key agreement protocol in Figure 10. Since
σ is associative, we have:
kA = σ(x, σ(y, z)) = σ(σ(x, y), z) = kB,
and thus the keys computed by Alice and Bob indeed are the same. On the other
hand, if Erich was listening carefully, he knows not only two function values, σ(x, y)
and σ(y, z), but he also knows y, the first argument of σ(y, z) and the second
argument of σ(x, y). That is why σ must be strongly noninvertible, in order to
prevent the direct attack that Erich computes Alice’s secret number x from σ(x, y)
and y or Bob’s secret number z from σ(y, z) and y, in which case he could easily
obtain their joint secret key, kA = kB. Analogous comments apply to Rabi and
Sherman’s digital signature protocol presented in Figure 11.
3.5 Discussion of Diffie–Hellman versus Rivest–Sherman
While the secret-key agreement protocol of Diffie and Hellman [DH76] is widely
used in practice, that of Rivest and Sherman (see [RS93,RS97]) is not (yet) used
in applications and, thus, might appear somewhat exotic at first glance. Note,
however, that neither the Diffie–Hellman nor the Rivest–Sherman protocol has a
proof of security up to date. So, let us digress for a moment to compare the state
of the art on these two protocols.
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Step
1 chooses two large numbers x
and y at random, keeps x se-
cret, and computes σ(x, y)
2
y, σ(x, y)⇒
3 chooses a large number z at
random, keeps z secret and
computes σ(y, z)
4
σ(y, z)⇐
5 computes her key
kA = σ(x, σ(y, z))
computes his key
kB = σ(σ(x, y), z)
Fig. 10. The Rivest–Sherman secret-key agreement protocol, which uses a strongly noninvertible,
associative one-way function σ.
Step
1 chooses two large numbers
xA and yA at random, keeps
xA secret, and computes
σ(xA, yA)
2
yA, σ(xA, yA)⇒
3 computes her signature
sigA(m) = σ(m, xA)
for the message m
4
m, sigA(m)⇒
5 verifies Alice’s signa-
ture by checking whether
σ(m, σ(xA, yA)) equals
σ(σ(m, xA), yA)
Fig. 11. The Rabi–Sherman digital signature protocol, which uses a strongly noninvertible, asso-
ciative one-way function σ.
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—While the Diffie–Hellman protocol uses a concrete function, the Rivest–Sherman
protocol is based on an unspecified, “abstract” function that is described only by
listing the properties it should satisfy. That is not to say that Rivest–Sherman
is an abstract version of Diffie–Hellman. Rather, the Rivest–Sherman protocol
may be seen as an alternative to the Diffie–Hellman protocol. The advantage of
Rivest and Sherman’s approach is that it is more flexible, as it does not depend
on a single function.
—The security of the Diffie–Hellman scheme is based on the (unproven, yet plau-
sible) assumption that computing discrete logarithms is a computationally in-
tractable task.
In contrast, the Rivest–Sherman scheme uses a candidate for a strongly nonin-
vertible, associative one-way function (see Section 5.1 for the formal definition)
as its key building block. Although it is not known whether such functions exist,
it has been shown recently by Hemaspaandra and this author [HR99] that they
do exist in the worst-case model under the (unproven, yet plausible) assumption
that P 6= NP, where P denotes the class of polynomial-time solvable problems,
and NP denotes the class of problems that can be solved nondeterministically in
polynomial time. Section 5 presents this result and a sketch of its proof.
—Breaking Diffie–Hellman is not even known to be as hard as computing discrete
logarithms, even though some nice progress in this direction has been made
recently by Maurer and Wolf [MW99], who established conditions for relating
the hardness of breaking Diffie–Hellman to that of computing discrete logarithms.
Again, their results rest on unproven, yet plausible assumptions. In particular,
let ν(p) denote the minimum, taken over all numbers d in the interval [p−2√p+
1, p+2
√
p+1], of the largest prime factors of d. The “smootheness assumption”
says that ν(p) is polynomial in log p. Why is this assumption plausible? The
idea is that numbers in the Hasse-Weil interval (which are sizes of elliptic curves)
are smooth with the same probability as random numbers of the same length,
and these probabilities are independent. Under this smoothness assumption,
Maurer and Wolf [MW99] proved that breaking Diffie–Hellman and computing
the discrete logarithm are polynomial-time equivalent tasks in the underlying
cyclic group, where the equivalence is nonuniform.
Similarly, even if strongly noninvertible, associative one-way functions were
known to exist, one could not conclude that the Rivest–Sherman protocol is
secure; rather, strong noninvertibility merely precludes certain types of direct at-
tacks [RS97,HR99]. Moreover, strongly noninvertible, associative one-way func-
tions could be constructed so far only in the worst-case complexity model, as-
suming P 6= NP. Although this result is relevant and interesting in a complexity-
theoretic setting, it has no direct implications in applied cryptography. For cryp-
tographic applications, one would need to construct such functions based on the
average-case complexity model, under plausible assumptions.
As noted in the outline of the tutorial, there is some hope for obtaining such a
strong result by combining Hemaspaandra and Rothe’s [HR99] technique on con-
structing strongly noninvertible, associative one-way functions in the worst case
with Ajtai’s [Ajt96] techniques on constructing hard instances of lattice problems.
The shortest lattice vector problem, denoted by SVP, is the problem of finding a
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shortest lattice vector in the lattice generated by a given lattice basis. Roughly
speaking, Ajtai [Ajt96] proved that the problem SVP is as hard in the average-case
as it is in the worst-case complexity model.
More precisely, Ajtai constructed an infinite family {Λn}n≥1 of lattices, where
each Λn is represented by a basis as an instance of SVP, and he showed the following
result: Suppose one can compute in polynomial time, for each n, an approximately
shortest vector in a lattice Λi randomly chosen from {Λn}n≥1, with non-negligible
probability. Then, the length of a shortest vector in every lattice from {Λn}n≥1 can
be estimated to within a fixed polynomial factor in polynomial time with probability
close to one. However, since the best approximation factor known to be achieved by
polynomial-time algorithms is essentially exponential, and since the best algorithms
known to achieve polynomial-factor approximations run in exponential time, it
follows that, as mentioned above, “SVP is as hard in the average-case as it is in
the worst-case model.” In this regard, the SVP is a unique problem; for no other
problem in NP that is believed to be outside P such a strong connection is known
to hold.
Based on the worst-case/average-case equivalence of SVP, Ajtai and
Dwork [AD97] designed a public-key cryptosystem whose cryptographic security
depends only on worst-case complexity assumptions. However, the worst-case hard-
ness of SVP (in the Euclidean norm) had remained an open problem for a long time.
Solving this problem, Ajtai [Ajt98] established the NP-hardness of SVP under ran-
domized reductions. His result was strengthened by Micciancio [Mic01], who also
simplified Ajtai’s proof. Since the construction of strongly noninvertible, associative
one-way functions in [HR99] is based on the assumption P 6= NP, it seems reason-
able to consider the NP-hard problem SVP to be a good candidate for achieving
strongly noninvertible, associative one-way functions even in the technically more
demanding average-case model.
The complexity of SVP and the use of lattices in crytography are covered
in the surveys by Cai [Cai99], Kumar and Sivakumar [KS01], and Nguyen and
Stern [NS01]. Interestingly, lattices are useful both in breaking existing cryp-
tosystems like RSA (e.g., the low-exponent attacks of H˚astad [H˚as88] and Cop-
persmith [Cop97]), see Section 2.4) and in designing secure cryptosystems (e.g., the
Ajtai-Dwork public-ley cryptosystem).
4. INTERACTIVE PROOF SYSTEMS AND ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOLS
In Section 3.1, we mentioned the Man-in-the-middle attack on the Diffie–Hellman
secret-key agreement protocol. Imagine that Bob has just agreed with his partner
on a joint secret key via a public telephone line. Of course, he assumes it was Alice
he was talking to. Bob was so clever to use the Diffie–Hellman protocol, and so he
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thinks that Erich does not have a clue about what secret key they have chosen:
???
Erich
But Erich was even smarter. Here is what really happened:
Erich
This situation raises the issue of authentication: How can Bob be certain that
it in fact was Alice he was communicating with, and not Erich pretending to be
Alice? In other words, how can Alice prove her identity to Bob beyond any doubt?
In Section 3, we have seen how to use digital signatures for the authentication of
documents such as email messages. In this section, our goal is to achieve authen-
tication of an individual rather than a document. One way to achieve this goal is
to assign to Alice’s identity some secret information such as her PIN (“Personal
Identifaction N umber”) or any other private information that nobody else knows.
We refer to the information proving Alice’s identity as Alice’s secret.
But here’s another catch. Alice would like to convince Bob of her identity by
proving that she knows her secret. Ideally, however, she should not disclose her
secret because then it wouldn’t be a secret anymore: If Bob, for example, knew
Alice’s secret, he could pretend to be Alice when communicating with somebody
else. So the question is:
How can one prove the knowledge of a secret without telling the secret?
That is precisely what zero-knowledge protocols are all about.
4.1 Interactive Proof Systems
Zero-knowledge protocols are a special form of interactive proof systems, which we
will describe first. Interactive proof systems were introduced by Shafi Goldwasser,
Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff [GMR85,GMR89]. Independently, Babai and
Moran [BM88,Bab85] developed the essentially equivalent notion of Arthur-Merlin
games.
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As in the previous protocols, we consider the communication between two parties,
the “prover” Alice and the “verifier” Bob:
Prover Verifier
For now, we are not interested in the security aspects that may arise when the
communication is eavesdropped; rather, we are concerned with the following com-
munication problem: Alice and Bob want to jointly solve a given problem L, i.e.,
they want to decide whether or not any given instance belongs to L. For concrete-
ness, consider the graph isomorphism problem.
Definition 4.1. The vertex set of any graph G is denoted by V (G), and the edge
set of G is denoted by E(G). Let G and H be undirected, simple graphs, i.e.,
graphs with no reflexive or multiple edges.
An isomorphism between G and H is a bijective mapping π from V (G) onto
V (H) such that, for all i, j ∈ V (G),
{i, j} ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ {π(i), π(j)} ∈ E(H).
Graph-Isomorphism denotes the set of all pairs of isomorphic graphs.
The graph isomorphism problem is to determine whether or not any two given
graphs are isomorphic. This problem belongs to NP, and since there is no efficient
algorithm known for solving it, it is widely considered to be a hard, intractable
problem. However, it is not known to be complete for NP, i.e., it is not known
whether this problem belongs to the hardest NP problems. In fact, due to its “low-
ness” properties, it is doubted that the graph isomorphism problem is NP-complete.
A set A is low for a complexity class C if it does not yield any additional compu-
tational power when used as an oracle by the machines representing the class C,
i.e., if CA = C. Scho¨ning [Sch87] showed that Graph-Isomorphism is in the second
level of the low hierarchy within NP, i.e., it is low for NPNP, the second level of
the polynomial hierarchy. It follows that if Graph-Isomorphism were NP-complete
then the polynomial hierarchy would collapse, which is considered unlikely. More-
over, Ko¨bler et al. [KST92] proved Graph-Isomorphism low for PP, probabilistic
polynomial time.
Therefore, it is conjectured that the graph isomorphism problem might be neither
in P nor NP-complete, and this is what makes this problem so interesting for
complexity theoreticians. Of course, proving this conjecture would immediately
prove P different from NP; so, such a proof seems beyond current techniques. For
more complexity-theoretic background on the graph isomorphism problem, we refer
to the book by Ko¨bler, Scho¨ning, and Tora´n [KST93].
We mention in passing that (language versions of) the factoring problem and the
discrete logarithm problem are not known to be NP-complete either. Unlike the
graph isomorphism problem, however, no lowness properties are known for these
two problems. Grollmann and Selman [GS88] have shown that a language version
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of the discrete logarithm problem is contained in UP, which denotes Valiant’s class
“unambiguous polynomial time” [Val76]. NP-complete problems are very unlikely
to belong to UP, so this result gives some evidence against the NP-completeness of
the discrete logarithm problem.
Returning to Alice and Bob’s communication problem, their task is to decide
whether or not any given pair (G,H) of graphs is isomorphic. Alice, the prover,
tries to prove them isomorphic by providing Bob with an isomorphism π between G
and H . She intends to convince Bob no matter whether or not G and H in fact are
isomorphic. But Bob is impatient. To accept the input, he wants to be convinced
with overwhelming probability that the proof provided by Alice indeed is correct.
Even worse, he is convinced only if every potential prover strategy Alice might come
up with yields an overwhelming success probability. If Alice can accomplish this
then Bob accepts the input, otherwise he rejects it.
To formalize this intuition, imagine Alice and Bob to be Turing machines. Al-
ice, the prover, is an all-powerful Turing machine with no computational limitation
whatsoever. Bob, the verifier, is a randomized Turing machine working in poly-
nomial time, but capable of making random moves by flipping an unbiased coin.
In Definition 4.2 below, in case of acceptance, it is enough that Alice finds one
sufficient strategy to convince Bob. In case of rejection, however, rather than con-
sidering every potential prover strategy of Alice, it is useful to quantify over all
possible provers that may replace Alice.
For the definition of randomized Turing machines, we refer to any textbook on
complexity theory such as [BDG95,BC93,HO02,Pap94,Pap94]. Essentially, every
nondeterministic Turing machine can be viewed as a randomized Turing machine
by defining a suitable probability measure on the computation trees of the machine.
Definition 4.2 Interactive Proof System. [GMR85,GMR89]
(1) An interactive proof system (or “IP protocol”) (A,B) is a protocol between
Alice, the prover, and Bob, the verifier. Alice runs a Turing machine A with
no limit on its resources, while Bob runs a polynomial-time randomized Turing
machine B. Both access the same input on a joint input tape, and they are
equipped with private work tapes for internal computations. They also share a
read-write communication tape to exchange messages. Alice does not see Bob’s
random choices. Let Pr((A,B)(x) = 1) denote the probability (according to
the random choices made in the communication) that Bob accepts the input x;
i.e., for a particular sequence of random bits, “(A,B)(x) = 1” denotes the event
that Bob is convinced by Alice’s proof for x and accepts.
(2) An interactive proof system (A,B) accepts a set L if and only if for each x:
x ∈ L =⇒ (∃A) [Pr((A,B)(x) = 1) ≥ 3
4
]; (4.14)
x 6∈ L =⇒ (∀Â) [Pr((Â, B)(x) = 1) ≤ 1
4
], (4.15)
where in (4.14) we quantify over the prover strategies (or “proofs”) for x of the
prescribed Turing machine A, whereas in (4.15) we quantify over the proofs Â
for x of any prover (i.e., any Turing machine of unlimited computational power)
that may replace the fixed Turing machine A.
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(3) IP denotes the class of all sets that can be accepted by an interactive proof
system.
Note that the acceptance probabilities of at least 34 if x ∈ L (respectively, of at
most 14 if x 6∈ L) are chosen at will. By probability amplification techniques [Pap94,
BDG95,BC93], one can use any constants 12 +ǫ and
1
2−ǫ, respectively, where ǫ > 0.
It is even possible to make the error probability as small as 2−p(|x|), for any fixed
polynomial p. Better yet, Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser [GMS87] have shown
that one can even require the acceptance probability of exactly 1 if x ∈ L, without
changing the class IP.
In the literature, verifier and prover are sometimes referred to as Arthur and
Merlin. In fact, the Arthur-Merlin games introduced by Babai and Moran [BM88,
Bab85] are nothing else than the interactive proof systems of Goldwasser et
al. [GMR85,GMR89]. One difference between Definition 4.2 and the definition
of Arthur-Merlin games is that the random bits chosen by Arthur are public (i.e.,
they are known to Merlin), while they are private to Bob in Definition 4.2. How-
ever, Goldwasser and Sipser [GS89] have shown that the privacy of the verifier’s
random bits does not matter: Arthur-Merlin games are equivalent to interactive
proof systems.
What if Bob has run out of coins? That is, what if he behaves deterministically
when verifying Alice’s proof for “x ∈ L”? Due to her unlimited computational
power, Alice can provide proofs of unlimited length, i.e., of length not bounded by
any function in the length of x. However, since Bob is a polynomial-time Turing
machine, it is clear that he can check only proofs of length polynomially in |x|. It
follows that IP, when restricted to deterministic polynomial-time verifiers, is just a
cumbersome way of defining the class NP. Hence, since Graph-Isomorphism belongs
to NP, it must also belong to the (unrestricted) class IP. We omit presenting an
explicit IP protocol for Graph-Isomorphism here, but we refer to Section 4.3, where
in Figure 13 an IP protocol for Graph-Isomorphism with an additional property is
given: it is a zero-knowledge protocol.
But what about the complement of Graph-Isomorphism? Does there exist an
interactive proof system that decides whether or not two given graphs are non-
isomorphic? Note that even though Alice is all-powerful computationally, she may
run into difficulties when she is trying to prove that the graphs are non-isomorphic.
Consider, for example, two non-isomorphic graphs with 1000 vertices each. A proof
of that fact seems to require Alice to show that none of the 1000! possible permu-
tations is an isomorphism between the graphs. Not only would it be impossible for
Bob to check such a long proof in polynomial time, also for Alice it would be liter-
ally impossible to write this proof down. After all, 1000! is approximately 4 ·102567.
This number exceeds the number of atoms in the entire visible universe,5 which is
currently estimated to be around 1077, by a truly astronomical factor.
That is why the following result of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW86,
GMW91] was a bit of a surprise.
Theorem 4.3. [GMW86,GMW91] Graph-Isomorphism is in IP.
5Dark matter excluded.
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Proof. Figure 12 shows the interactive proof system for the graph non-
isomorphism problem.
Step
Input: Two graphs G1 and G2
1 randomly chooses a permuta-
tion pi on V (G1) and a bit
b ∈ {1, 2}, and computes H =
pi(Gb)
2
H⇐
3 determines a ∈ {1, 2} such that
Ga and H are isomorphic
4
a⇒
5 accepts if and only if a = b
Fig. 12. The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson IP protocol for Graph-Isomorphism.
Let us check that the implications (4.14) and (4.15) from Definition 4.2 do hold.
Suppose that G1 and G2 are non-isomorphic. Then, it is easy for Alice to determine
that graph Gb, b ∈ {1, 2}, to which H is isomorphic. So she sends a = b, and Bob
accepts with probability 1. That is,
(G1, G2) ∈ Graph-Isomorphism =⇒ (∃A) [Pr((A,B)(G1, G2) = 1) = 1].
Now suppose that G1 and G2 are isomorphic. Then, no matter what clever
strategy Alice applies, her chance of answering correctly (i.e., with a = b) is no
better than 12 because she does not see Bob’s random bit b and so can do no better
than guessing. That is,
(G1, G2) 6∈ Graph-Isomorphism =⇒ (∀Â) [Pr((Â, B)(G1, G2) = 1) ≤ 1
2
].
Note that the acceptance probability of ≤ 12 above is not yet the acceptance prob-
ability of ≤ 14 required in (4.15) of Definition 4.2. However, as mentioned above,
standard probability amplification techniques yield an error probability as close to
zero as one desires. We leave the details to the reader.
By definition, IP contains all of NP. The above result shows that IP also contains
a problem from coNP, the class of complements of NP problems, which is unlikely
to be contained in NP. So, the question arises of how big the class IP actually is.
A famous result of Adi Shamir [Sha92] settled this question: IP equals PSPACE,
the class of problems that can be decided in polynomial space.
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4.2 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Recalling the issue of authentication mentioned at the beginning of this section, we
are now ready to define zero-knowledge protocols.
As mentioned above, Graph-Isomorphism is in IP. To prove that the two given
graphs are isomorphic, Alice simply sends an isomorphism π to Bob, which he
then checks deterministically in polynomial time. Suppose, however, that Alice
wants to keep the isomorphism π secret. On the one hand, she does not want to
disclose her secret; on the other hand, she wants to prove to Bob that she knows it.
What she needs is a very special IP protocol that conveys nothing about her secret
isomorphism, and yet proves that the graphs are isomorphic. The next section will
present such a zero-knowledge protocol for Graph-Isomorphism.
But what is a zero-knowledge protocol and how can one formalize it? The in-
tuition is this. Imagine that Alice has a twin sister named Malice who looks just
like her. However, Malice does not know Alice’s secret. Moreover, Malice does not
have Alice’s unlimited computational power; rather, just as the verifier Bob, she
only operates like a randomized polynomial-time Turing machine. Still, she tries to
simulate Alice’s communication with Bob. An IP protocol has the zero-knowledge
property if the information communicated in Malice’s simulated protocol cannot
be distinguished from the information communicated in Alice’s original protocol.
Malice, not knowing the secret, cannot put any information about the secret into
her simulated protocol, and yet she is able to generate that clone of the original
protocol that looks just like the original to an independent observer. Consequently,
the verifier Bob (or any other party such as Erich) cannot extract any informa-
tion from the original protocol. In short, if there’s nothing in there, you can’t get
anything out of it.
Definition 4.4 Zero-Knowledge Protocols. [GMR85,GMR89] Let (A,B) be an
interactive proof system accepting a problem L. We say (A,B) is a zero-knowledge
protocol for L if and only if there exists a simulator Malice such that the following
holds:
—Malice runs a randomized polynomial-time Turing machine M to simulate the
prover Alice in her communication with Bob, thus yielding a simulated protocol
(M,B);
—for each x ∈ L, the tuples (a1, a2, . . . , ak) and (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) representing the
communication in (A,B) and in (M,B), respectively, are identically distributed
over the coin tosses of A and B in (A,B) and ofM and B in (M,B), respectively.
The above definition is called “honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge” in the
literature. That is, (a) one assumes that the verifier is honest, and (b) one requires
that the information communicated in the simulated protocol perfectly coincides
with the information communicated in the original protocol.
Assumption (a) is not quite realistic for most cryptographic applications. A
dishonest verifier might alter the protocol to his own advantage. Therefore, one
should modify the definition above to require that for each verifier B∗ there exists a
simulatorM∗ generating a simulated protocol not distinguishable from the original
one. However, honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols with public random bits
can always be transformed to protocols that have the zero-knowledge property also
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in the presence of dishonest verifiers.
Regarding assumption (b), there are several other notions of zero-knowledge
that are weaker than perfect zero-knowledge, such as “statistical zero-knowledge”
and “computational zero-knowledge.” In a statistical zero-knowledge protocol (also
known as almost-perfect zero-knowledge protocol), one requires that the information
communicated in the original and in the simulated protocol be indistinguishable by
certain statistical tests. In a computational zero-knowledge protocol, one merely re-
quires that the information communicated in the original and in the simulated pro-
tocol be computationally indistinguishable, i.e., for each randomized polynomial-
time Turing machine, the probability of detecting differences in the corresponding
distributions is negligibly small.
In the latter model, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW86,GMW91] showed
what is considered by far the most important result on zero-knowledge: Every prob-
lem in NP has a computational zero-knowledge protocol under the plausible assump-
tion that there exist cryptographically secure bit-commitment schemes. The key
idea is a computational zero-knowledge protocol for Graph-Three-Colorability, a
well-known NP-complete problem. In contrast, it seems unlikely [BC89] that such
a strong claim can be proven for the perfect zero-knowledge model presented in
Definition 4.4.
For more information about interactive proof systems and zero-knowledge, we
refer to the books by Goldreich [Gol01b, Chapter 4], Ko¨bler et al. [KST93, Chap-
ter 2], Papadimitriou [Pap94, Chapter 12.2], Balca´zar et al. [BDG90, Chapter 11],
and Bovet et al. [BC93, Chapter 10] and to the surveys by Oded Goldreich [Gol88],
Shafi Goldwasser [Gol89], and Joan Feigenbaum [Fei92].
4.3 Zero-Knowledge Protocol for the Graph Isomorphism Problem
Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson [GMW86,GMW91] proposed a
zero-knowledge protocol for the graph isomorphism problem. This result was quite
a surprise, since previously zero-knowledge protocols were known only for problems
contained both in NP and coNP. It is considered to be unlikely that NP equals
coNP; in particular, it is considered to be unlikely that Graph-Isomorphism is in
coNP.
Theorem 4.5. [GMW86,GMW91] Graph-Isomorphism has a zero-knowledge
protocol.
Proof. Figure 13 shows the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol. One differ-
ence to the protocol for the graph non-isomorphism problem in Figure 12 is that
now Alice too makes random choices.
Alice’s secret is the isomorphism π she has chosen. The protocol is correct, since
Alice knows her secret π and also her random permutation ρ. Hence, she can easily
compute the isomorphism σ with σ(Gb) = H to prove her identity to Bob. When
doing so, she does not have to disclose her secret π to Bob in order to convince him
of her identity. In particular,
(G1, G2) ∈ Graph-Isomorphism =⇒ (∃A) [Pr((A,B)(G1, G2) = 1) = 1],
so the implication (4.14) from Definition 4.2 holds. Since Alice herself has cho-
sen two isomorphic graphs, the case (G1, G2) 6∈ Graph-Isomorphism does not oc-
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cur, so the implication (4.15) from Definition 4.2 trivially holds if the protocol
is implemented properly. Thus, the protocol is an interactive proof system for
Graph-Isomorphism.
Recall that Alice wants to prove her identity via this protocol. Suppose that Erich
or Malice want to cheat by pretending to be Alice. They do not know her secret
isomorphism π, but they do know the public isomorphic graphs G1 and G2. They
want to convince Bob that they know Alice’s secret, which corresponds to (G1, G2).
If, by coincidence, Bob’s bit b equals their previously chosen bit a, they win. How-
ever, if b 6= a, computing σ = ρ ◦ π or σ = ρ ◦ π−1 requires knowledge of π.
Without knowing π, computing π from the public graphs G1 and G2 seems to be
impossible for them, since Graph-Isomorphism is a hard problem, too hard even for
randomized polynomial-time Turing machines. Thus, they will fail provided that
the graphs are chosen large enough.
Step
Generation of isomorphic graphs and a secret isomorphism
1 chooses a large graph G1, a
random permutation pi on G1’s
vertices, and computes the
graph G2 = pi(G1);
(G1, G2) are public, pi is pri-
vate
Protocol
2 randomly chooses a permuta-
tion ρ on V (G1) and a bit a ∈
{1, 2}, computes H = ρ(Ga)
3
H⇒
4 chooses a bit b ∈ {1, 2} at ran-
dom and wants to see an iso-
morphism between Gb and H
5
b⇐
6 computes the permutation
σ =


ρ if b = a
ρ ◦ pi if 1 = b 6= a = 2
ρ ◦ pi−1 if 2 = b 6= a = 1
satisfying σ(Gb) = H
7
σ⇒
8 verifies that indeed
σ(Gb) = H
and accepts accordingly
Fig. 13. The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson zero-knowledge protocol for graph isomorphism.
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Since they cannot do better than guessing the bit b, they can cheat with prob-
ability at most 12 . Of course, they can always guess the bit b, which implies that
their chance of cheating successfully is exactly 12 . Hence, if Bob demands, say, k
independent rounds of the protocol to be executed, he can make the cheating prob-
ability as small as 2−k, and thus is very likely to detect any cheater. Note that
after only 20 rounds the odds of malicious Malice getting away with it undetected
are less than one to one million. Hence, the protocol is correct.
Step Malice
Simulated generation of isomorphic graphs
1 knows the public pair (G1, G2)
of isomorphic graphs, does not
know Alice’s secret pi
Simulated Protocol
2 randomly chooses a permuta-
tion ρ on V (G1) and a bit a ∈
{1, 2}, computes H = ρ(Ga)
3
H⇒
4 chooses a bit b ∈ {1, 2} at ran-
dom and wants to see an iso-
morphism between Gb and H
5
b⇐
6 if b 6= a thenM deletes all mes-
sages transmitted in this round
and repeats;
if b = a then M sends σ = ρ
7
σ⇒
8 b = a implies that indeed
σ(Gb) = H,
so Bob accepts “Alice’s” iden-
tity
Fig. 14. How to simulate the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol without knowing the secret pi.
It remains to show that the protocol in Figure 13 is zero-knowledge. Figure 14
shows a simulated protocol with Malice, who does not know the secret π, replacing
Alice. The information communicated in one round of the protocol is given by
a triple of the form (H, b, σ). Whenever Malice chooses a bit a with a = b, she
simply sends σ = ρ and wins: Bob, or any independent observer, will not detect
that she in fact is Malice. Otherwise, whenever a 6= b, Malice fails. However, that’s
no problem at all: She simply deletes this round from the simulated protocol and
repeats. Thus, she can produce a sequence of triples of the form (H, b, σ) that is
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indistinguishable from the corresponding sequence of triples in the original protocol
between Alice and Bob. It follows that the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol is
zero-knowledge.
4.4 Fiat and Shamir’s Zero-Knowledge Protocol
Based on a similar protocol by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89], Amos Fiat
and Adi Shamir [FS86] proposed a zero-knowledge protocol for a number-theoretical
problem. It is based on the assumption that computing square roots in Z∗n is
infeasible in practice. Due to its properties, the Fiat-Shamir protocol is particularly
suitable for authentication of individuals in large computer networks. It is a public-
key protocol, it is more efficient than other public-key protocols such as the RSA
algorithm, it can be implemented on a chip card, and it is zero-knowledge. These
advantages resulted in a rapid deployment of the protocol in practical applications.
The Fiat-Shamir protocol is integrated in the “Videocrypt” Pay-TV system [CH91].
The original Fiat-Shamir identification scheme has later been improved by Feige,
Fiat und Shamir [FFS88] to a zero-knowledge protocol in which not only the secret
square roots modulo n are not revealed, but also the information of whether or not
there exists a square root modulo n is not leaked.
The theory of zero-knowledge may also become important in future internet
technologies. To prevent confusion, we note that Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc.,
a Montre´al-based company that was founded in 1997 and provides products and
services enabling users to protect their privacy on-line on the world wide web, is
not a commercial fielding of zero-knowledge protocols [Gol01a].
Theorem 4.6. [FS86] The Fiat-Shamir procedure given in Figure 15 is a zero-
knowledge protocol.
Proof. Look at Figure 15. The protocol is correct, since Alice knows the secret
s ∈ Z∗n that she has chosen, and thus she can compute y = r · sb, where b is the bit
that Bob has chosen at random. Hence, it holds in Z∗n that
y2 ≡ (r · sb)2 ≡ r2 · s2b ≡ r2 · vb ≡ x · vb mod n,
so Bob accepts Alice’s identity.
Suppose now that Erich or Malice want to cheat by pretending to be Alice. They
do not know her secret s, nor do they know the primes p and q, but they do know
the public n = pq and v = s2 mod n. They want to convince Bob that they know
Alice’s secret s, the square root of v modulo n. If, by coincidence, Bob’s bit b
equals zero then y = r · s0 = r and they win. However, if b = 1, computing a
y that satisfies y2 ≡ x · vb mod n requires knowledge of the secret s, assuming
that computing square roots modulo n is hard. Without knowing s, if Malice or
Erich were able to compute the correct answer for both b = 0 and b = 1, say yb
with y2b ≡ x · vb mod n, they could efficiently compute square roots modulo n as
follows: y20 ≡ x mod n and y21 ≡ x · v mod n implies (y1y0 )2 ≡ v mod n; hence,
y1
y0
is a square root of v modulo n.
It follows that they can cheat with probability at most 12 . Of course, they can
always guess the bit b in advance and prepare the answer accordingly. Choosing
x = r2 · v−b mod n and y = r implies that
y2 ≡ r2 ≡ r2 · v−b · vb ≡ x · vb mod n. (4.16)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
44 · Jo¨rg Rothe
Step
Key generation
1 chooses two large primes p and
q and a secret s ∈ Z∗n, n = pq,
and computes v = s2 mod n;
p, q, and s are kept secret,
whereas n and v are public
Protocol
2 chooses r ∈ Z∗n at random and
computes x = r2 mod n
3
x⇒
4 chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at ran-
dom
5
b⇐
6 computes y = r · sb mod n
7
y⇒
8 verifies that indeed
y2 ≡ x · vb mod n
and accepts accordingly
Fig. 15. The Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge protocol.
Thus, Bob will not detect any irregularities and will accept. Hence, their chance to
cheat successfully is exactly 12 . Again, if Bob demands, say, k independent rounds
of the protocol to be executed, he can make the cheating probability as small as
desired and is very likely to detect any cheater.
It remains to show that the Fiat-Shamir protocol in Figure 15 is zero-knowledge.
Figure 16 shows a simulated protocol with Malice, who does not know the secret s,
replacing Alice. The information communicated in one round of the protocol is
given by a triple of the form (x, b, y). In addition to the randomly chosen r ∈ Z∗n,
Malice guesses a bit c ∈ {0, 1} and computes x = r2 · v−c mod n, which she sends
to Bob. Whenever c happens to be equal to Bob’s bit b, Malice simply sends y = r
and wins. By an argument analogous to Equation (4.16) above, neither Bob nor
any independent observer will detect that she actually is Malice:
y2 ≡ r2 ≡ r2 · v−c · vb ≡ x · vb mod n.
Otherwise, whenever c 6= b, Malice fails. However, that’s no problem at all: She
simply deletes this round from the simulated protocol and repeats. Thus, she can
produce a sequence of triples of the form (x, b, y) that is indistinguishable from the
corresponding sequence of triples in the original protocol between Alice and Bob.
It follows that the Fiat-Shamir protocol is zero-knowledge.
We have chosen to give here the original Fiat-Shamir identification scheme as
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Step Malice
Simulated key generation
1 knows the public n = pq and
v = s2 mod n;
does not know the private
primes p and q and Alice’s se-
cret s
Simulated Protocol
2 randomly chooses r ∈ Z∗n and
a bit c ∈ {0, 1},
computes x = r2 · v−c mod n
3
x⇒
4 chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at ran-
dom
5
b⇐
6 if b 6= c thenM deletes all mes-
sages transmitted in this round
and repeats;
if b = c then M sends y = r
7
y⇒
8 b = c implies that indeed
y2 = r2 = r2v−cvb
≡ x · vb mod n,
so Bob accepts “Alice’s” iden-
tity
Fig. 16. How to simulate the Fiat-Shamir protocol without knowing the secret s.
presented in most books (see, e.g., [Gol01b,BSW01]). Note, however, that quite a
number of modifications and improvements of the Fiat-Shamir protocol have been
proposed, including the “zero-knowledge proof of knowledge” protocol of Feige,
Fiat und Shamir [FFS88]. We also note in passing that we omitted many formal
details in our arguments in this section. A rigid formalism (see [Gol01b]) is helpful in
discussing many subtleties that can arise in zero-knowledge protocols. For example,
looking at Figure 15, Alice could be impersonated by anyone who picks the value
r = 0 without Bob detecting this fraud. We refer to Burmester and Desmedt [BD89]
for appropriate modifications of the scheme. Moreover, Burmester et al. [BDPW89,
BDB92] proposed efficient zero-knowledge protocols in a general algebraic setting.
5. STRONGLY NONINVERTIBLE ASSOCIATIVE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
Recall Rivest and Sherman’s secret-key agreement protocol (Figure 10) and Rabi
and Sherman’s digital signature protocol (Figure 11) presented in Section 3.4. Both
of these protocols use a candidate for a strongly noninvertible, associative one-way
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function. Are these protocols secure? This question has two aspects: (1) Are
they secure under the assumption that strongly noninvertible, associative one-way
functions indeed exist? (2) What evidence do we have for the existence of such
functions?
The first question is an open problem. Security here depends on precisely how
“strong noninvertibility” is defined, and in which model. Traditional complexity
theory is concerned with the worst-case model and has identified a large number
of problems that are hard in the worst case. Cryptographic applications, however,
require the more demanding average-case model (see, e.g., [Gol01b,Gol99,Lub96])
for which much less is known. As noted by Rabi and Sherman [RS97], no proof of
security for the Rivest–Sherman and Rabi–Sherman protocols is currently known,
and even assuming the existence of associative one-way functions that are strongly
noninvertible in the weaker worst-case model would not imply that the protocols are
secure. In that regard, however, the Rivest–Sherman and Rabi–Sherman protocols
are just like many other protocols currently used in practical applications. For
example, neither the Diffie–Hellman protocol nor the RSA protocol currently has
a proof of security. There are merely heuristic, intuitive arguments about how to
avoid certain direct attacks. The “security” of the Diffie–Hellman protocol draws
on the assumption that computing discrete logarithms is hard, and the “security”
of the RSA protocol draws on the assumption that factoring large integers is hard.
Breaking Diffie–Hellman is not even known to be as hard as the discrete logarithm
problem, and breaking RSA is not even known to be as hard as the factoring
problem. In a similar vein, Rabi and Sherman [RS93,RS97] only give intuitive
arguments for the security of their protocols, explaining how to employ the strong
noninvertibility of associative one-way functions to preclude certain direct attacks.
Turning to the second question raised above: What evidence do we have that
strongly noninvertible, associative one-way functions exist? Assuming P 6= NP, we
will show how to construct total, strongly noninvertible, commutative,6 associative
one-way functions [HR99]. The question of whether or not P equals NP is perhaps
the most important question in theoretical computer science. It is widely believed
that P differs from NP, although this question has remained open for more than
thirty years now. For more background on complexity theory, we refer to the
textbooks [BDG95,BC93,HO02,Pap94].
5.1 Definitions and Progress of Results
From now on, we adopt the worst-case notion of one-way functions that is due to
Grollmann and Selman [GS88], see also the papers by Ko [Ko85], Berman [Ber77],
and Allender [All85,All86], and the surveys [Sel92,BHHR99]. Recall that one-way
functions are easy to compute but hard to invert. To prevent the notion of non-
invertibility from being trivialized, one-way functions are required to be “honest,”
i.e., to not shrink their inputs too much. Formal definitions of various types of
honesty can be found in [GS88,HRW97,HR00,RH02,HPR01,Hom00,HT02].
One-way functions are often considered to be one-argument functions. Since the
protocols from Section 3.4 require two-argument functions, the original definition
6Commutativity is needed to extend the Rivest–Sherman and Rabi–Sherman protocols from two
parties to m > 2 parties.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Some Facets of Complexity Theory and Cryptography · 47
is here tailored to the case of two-ary functions. Let ρ : N × N → N be any two-
ary function; ρ may be nontotal and it may be many-to-one. We say that ρ is
(polynomial-time) invertible if there exists a polynomial-time computable function
g such that for all z ∈ image(ρ), it holds that ρ(g(z)) = z; otherwise, we call ρ not
polynomial-time invertible, or noninvertible for short. We say that ρ is a one-way
function if and only if ρ is honest, polynomial-time computable, and noninvertible.
One-argument one-way functions are well-known to exist if and only if P 6= NP;
see, e.g., [Sel92,BDG95]. It is easy to prove the analogous result for two-argument
one-way functions, see [HR99,RS97].
We now define strong noninvertibility (strongness, for short). As with noninvert-
ibility, strongness requires an appropriate notion of honesty so as to not be trivial.
This notion is called “s-honesty” in [HPR01], and since it is merely a technical
requirement, we omit a formal definition here. Intuitively, “s-honesty” fits the no-
tion of strong noninvertibility in that it is measured not only in the length of the
function value but also in the length of the corresponding given argument.
Definition 5.1. (see [RS97,HR99]) Let σ : N×N→ N be any two-ary function;
σ may be nontotal and it may be many-to-one. Let 〈·, ·〉 : N × N → N be some
standard pairing function.
(1) We say that σ is (polynomial-time) invertible with respect to its first argument
if and only if there exists a polynomial-time computable function g1 such that
for all z ∈ image(σ) and for all a and b with (a, b) ∈ domain(σ) and σ(a, b) = z,
it holds that σ(a, g1(〈a, z〉)) = z.
(2) We say that σ is (polynomial-time) invertible with respect to its second argument
if and only if there exists a polynomial-time computable funtion g2 such that
for all z ∈ image(σ) and for all a and b with (a, b) ∈ domain(σ) and σ(a, b) = z,
it holds that σ(g2(〈b, z〉), b) = z.
(3) We say that σ is strongly noninvertible if and only if σ is neither invertible with
respect to its first argument nor invertible with respect to its second argument.
(4) We say that σ is a strong one-way function if and only if σ is s-honest,
polynomial-time computable, and strongly noninvertible.
Below, we define Rabi and Sherman’s notion of associativity, which henceforth
will be called “weak associativity.”
Definition 5.2. [RS93,RS97] A two-ary function σ : N× N → N is said to be
weakly associative if and only if σ(a, σ(b, c)) = σ(σ(a, b), c) holds for all a, b, c ∈ N
for which each of (a, b), (b, c), (a, σ(b, c)), and (σ(a, b), c) belongs to the domain
of σ.
Although this notion is suitable for total functions, weak associativity does not
adequately fit the nontotal function case. More precisely, weak associativity fails
to preclude, for nontotal functions, equations from having a defined value to the
left, while being undefined to the right of their equality sign. Therefore, we present
in Definition 5.3 below another notion of associativity for two-ary functions that is
suitable both for total and for nontotal two-ary functions. This definition is due to
Hemaspaandra and Rothe [HR99] who note that the two notions of associativity
are provably distinct (see Proposition5.4), and this distinction can be explained
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(see [HR99]) via Kleene’s careful discussion [Kle52, pp. 327–328] of two distinct
notions of equality for partial functions in recursion theory: “Weak equality” be-
tween two partial functions explicitly allows “specific, defined function values being
equal to undefined” as long as the functions take the same values on their joint
domain. In contrast, “complete equality” precludes this unnatural behavior by ad-
ditionally requiring that two given partial functions be equal only if their domains
coincide; i.e., whenever one is undefined, so is the other. Weak associativity from
Definition 5.2 is based on Kleene’s weak equality between partial functions, whereas
associativity from Definition 5.3 is based on Kleene’s complete equality.
Definition 5.3. [HR99] Let σ : N×N→ N be any two-ary function; σ may be
nontotal. Define N⊥ = N ∪ {⊥}, and define an extension ⊥σ: N⊥ × N⊥ → N⊥ of σ
as follows:
⊥
σ(a, b) =
{
σ(a, b) if a 6= ⊥ and b 6= ⊥ and (a, b) ∈ domain(σ)
⊥ otherwise.
We say that σ is associative if and only if, for all a, b, c ∈ N, it holds that
⊥
σ(
⊥
σ(a, b), c) =
⊥
σ(a,
⊥
σ(b, c)).
We say that σ is commutative if and only if, for all a, b ∈ N, it holds that
⊥
σ(a, b) =
⊥
σ(b, a).
The following proposition explores the relation between the two associativity
notions presented respectively in Definition 5.2 and in Definition 5.3. In particular,
these are indeed different notions.
Proposition 5.4. [HR99]
(1 ) Every associative two-ary function is weakly associative.
(2 ) Every total two-ary function is associative exactly if it is weakly associative.
(3 ) There exist two-ary functions that are weakly associative, yet not associative.
Rabi and Sherman [RS93,RS97] showed that P 6= NP if and only if commutative,
weakly associative one-way functions exist. However, they did not achieve strong
noninvertibility. They did not achieve totality of their weakly associative one-way
functions, although they presented a construction that they claimed achieves total-
ity of any weakly associative one-way function. Hemaspaandra and Rothe [HR99]
showed that Rabi and Sherman’s claim is unlikely to be true: Any proof of this
claim would imply that NP = UP, which is considered to be unlikely. Intuitively,
the reason that Rabi and Sherman’s construction is unlikely to work is that the func-
tions constructed in [RS93,RS97] are not associative in the sense of Definition 5.3.
In contrast, the Rabi–Sherman construction indeed is useful to achieve totality of
the associative, strongly noninvertible one-way functions constructed in [HR99].
Thus, Rabi and Sherman [RS93,RS97] left open the question of whether there
are plausible complexity-theoretic conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of
total, strongly noninvertible, commutative, associative one-way functions. They
also asked whether such functions could be constructed from any given one-way
function. Section 5.2 presents the answers to these questions.
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5.2 Creating Strongly Noninvertible, Total, Commutative, Associative One-Way Func-
tions from Any One-Way Function
Theorem 5.5 below is the main result of this section. Since P 6= NP is equivalent
to the existence of one-way functions with no additional properties required, the
converse of the implication stated in Theorem 5.5 is clearly also true. However,
we focus on only the interesting implication directions in Theorem 5.5 and in the
upcoming Theorem 5.7 and Theorem 5.9.
Theorem 5.5. [HR99] If P 6= NP then there exist total, strongly noninvert-
ible, commutative, associative one-way functions.
A detailed proof of Theorem 5.5 can be found in [HR99], see also the sur-
vey [BHHR99]. Here, we briefly sketch the proof idea.
Assume P 6= NP. Let A be a set in NP − P, and let M be a fixed NP machine
accepting A. Let x ∈ A be an input accepted by M in time p(|x|), where p is
some polynomial. A useful property of NP sets is that they have polynomial-time
checkable certificates.7 That is, for each certificate z for “x ∈ A,” it holds that:
(a) the length of z is polynomially bounded in the length of x, and (b) z certifies
membership of x in A in a way that can be verified deterministically in polynomial
time. CertificatesM (x) denotes the set of all certificates of M on input x. Note
that CertificatesM (x) is nonempty exactly if x ∈ A.
Key:
BEFORE: AFTER:b
a a
b
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d d
f f
hh
e eg g
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BLUE
Fig. 17. The three-coloring ψ of graph G.
Example 5.6. For concreteness, consider Graph-Three-Colorability, a well-
known NP-complete problem that asks whether the vertices of a given graph can
be colored with three colors such that no two adjacent vertices receive the same
color. Such a coloring is called a legal three-coloring. In other words, a legal three-
coloring is a mapping ψ from the vertex set of G to the set of colors (RED, GREEN,
7Other common names for “certificate” are “witness” and “proof” and “solution.”
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BLUE) such that the resulting color classes are independent sets. Figure 17 gives
an example.
The standard NP machine for Graph-Three-Colorability works as follows:
Given a graph G, nondeterministically guess a three-coloring ψ of G (i.e., a par-
tition of the vertex set of G into three color classes) and check deterministically
whether ψ is legal.
Any legal three-coloring of G is a certificate for the three-colorability of G
(with respect to the above NP machine). For the specific graph from Figure 17,
one certificate ψ is specified by the three color classes ψ−1(GREEN) = {a, g},
ψ−1(RED) = {c, f, h}, and ψ−1(BLUE) = {b, d, e}.
As is standard, graphs as well as three-colorings can be encoded as binary strings
that represent nonnegative integers.
Suppose that for each x ∈ A and for each certificate z for “x ∈ A,” it holds that
|z| = p(|x|) > |x|. This is only a technical requirement that makes it easy to tell
input strings apart from their certificates. For any integers u, v, w ∈ N, let min(u, v)
denote the minimum of u and v, and let min(u, v, w) denote the minimum of u, v,
and w. Define a two-ary function σ : N× N→ N as follows:
—If a = 〈x, z1〉 and b = 〈x, z2〉 for some x ∈ A with certificates z1, z2 ∈
CertificatesM (x) (where, possibly, z1 = z2), then define σ(a, b) =
〈x,min(z1, z2)〉;
—if there exists some x ∈ A with certificate z ∈ CertificatesM (x) such that either
a = 〈x, x〉 and b = 〈x, z〉, or a = 〈x, z〉 and b = 〈x, x〉, then define σ(a, b) = 〈x, x〉;
—otherwise, σ(a, b) is undefined.
What is the intuition behind the definition of σ? The number of certificates
contained in the arguments of σ is decreased by one in a way that ensures the
associativity of σ. Moreover, σ is noninvertible, and it is also strongly noninvertible.
Why? The intuition here is that, regardless of whether none or either one of its
arguments is given in addition to σ’s function value, the inversion of σ requires
information about the certificates for elements of A. However, our assumption that
A 6∈ P guarantees that this information cannot efficiently be extracted.
One can show that σ is a commutative, associative one-way function that is
strongly noninvertible. We will show associativity and strongness below. Note that
σ is not a total function. However, σ can be extended to a total function without
losing any of its other properties already established [HR99].
We now show that σ is strongly noninvertible. For a contradiction, suppose there
is a polynomial-time computable inverter, g2, for a fixed second argument. Hence,
for each w ∈ image(σ) and for each second argument b for which there is an a ∈ N
with σ(a, b) = w, it holds that
σ(g2(〈b, w〉), b) = w.
Then, contradicting our assumption that A 6∈ P, one could decide A in polynomial
time as follows:
On input x, compute g2(〈〈x, x〉, 〈x, x〉〉), compute the integers d and e
for which 〈d, e〉 equals g2(〈〈x, x〉, 〈x, x〉〉), and accept x if and only if
d = x and e ∈ CertificatesM (x).
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Hence, σ is not invertible with respect to its second argument. An analogous
argument shows that σ is not invertible with respect to its first argument. Thus, σ
is strongly noninvertible.
Next, we prove that σ is associative. Let
⊥
σ be the total extension of σ as in
Definition 5.3. Fix any three elements of N, say a = 〈a1, a2〉, b = 〈b1, b2〉, and
c = 〈c1, c2〉. To show that
⊥
σ(
⊥
σ(a, b), c) =
⊥
σ(a,
⊥
σ(b, c)) (5.17)
holds, distinguish two cases.
Case 1:. a1 = b1 = c1 and {a2, b2, c2} ⊆ {a1} ∪ CertificatesM (a1).
Let x, y ∈ {a, b, c} be any two fixed arguments of σ. As noted above, if x and y
together contain i certificates for “a1 ∈ A,” where i ∈ {1, 2}, then σ(x, y)—and thus
also
⊥
σ(x, y)—contains exactly max{0, i−1} certificates for “a1 ∈ A.” In particular,
⊥
σ(x, y) preserves the minimum certificate if both x and y contain a certificate for
“a1 ∈ A.”
If exactly one of x and y contains a certificate for “a1 ∈ A,” then ⊥σ (x, y) =
〈a1, a1〉.
If none of x and y contains a certificate for “a1 ∈ A,” then σ(x, y) is undefined,
so
⊥
σ(x, y) = ⊥.
Let k ≤ 3 be a number telling us how many of a2, b2, and c2 belong to
CertificatesM (a1). For example, if a2 = b2 = c2 ∈ CertificatesM (a1) then
k = 3. Consequently:
—If k ≤ 1 then both ⊥σ(⊥σ(a, b), c) and ⊥σ(a, ⊥σ(b, c)) equals ⊥.
—If k = 2 then both
⊥
σ(
⊥
σ(a, b), c) and
⊥
σ(a,
⊥
σ(b, c)) equals 〈a1, a1〉.
—If k = 3 then both
⊥
σ(
⊥
σ(a, b), c) and
⊥
σ(a,
⊥
σ(b, c)) equals 〈a1,min(a2, b2, c2)〉.
In each of these three cases, Equation (5.17) is satisfied.
Case 2:. Suppose Case 1 is not true.
Then, either it holds that a1 6= b1 or a1 6= c1 or b1 6= c1, or it holds that
a1 = b1 = c1 and {a2, b2, c2} is not contained in {a1} ∪ CertificatesM (a1). By
the definition of σ, in both cases it follows that
⊥
σ(
⊥
σ(a, b), c) = ⊥ = ⊥σ(a, ⊥σ(b, c)),
which satisfies Equation (5.17) and concludes the proof that σ is associative.
Finally, we mention some related results of Chris Homan [Hom00] who studied
upper and lower bounds on the ambiguity of associative one-way functions. In
particular, extending Rabi and Sherman’s [RS97] result that no total, associative
one-way function is injective, he proved that no total, associative one-way function
can be constant-to-one. He also showed that, under the plausible assumption that
P 6= UP, there exist linear-to-one, total, strongly noninvertible, associative one-way
functions.
On a slightly less related note, Homan and Thakur [HT02] recently proved that
one-way permutations (i.e., one-way functions that are total, one-to-one, and onto)
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exist if and only if P 6= UP ∩ coUP. This result gives a characterization of one-
way permutations in terms of a complexity class separation, and thus the ultimate
answer to a question studied in [GS88,HRW97,HR00,RH02].
5.3 If P 6= NP then Some Strongly Noninvertible Functions are Invertible
Is every strongly noninvertible function noninvertible? Hemaspaandra, Pasanen,
and Rothe [HPR01] obtained the surprising result that if P 6= NP then this is
not necessarily the case. This result shows that the term “strong noninvertibility”
introduced in [RS93,RS97] actually is a misnomer, since it seems to suggest that
strong noninvertibility always implies noninvertibility, which is not true.
Theorem 5.7. [HPR01] If P 6= NP then there exists a total, honest two-ary
function that is strongly one-way but not a one-way function.
We give a brief sketch of the proof. Assume P 6= NP. Then, there exists a total
two-ary one-way function, call it ρ. For any integer n ∈ N, define the notation
odd(n) = 2n+ 1 and even(n) = 2n.
Define a function σ : N × N → N as follows. Let a, b ∈ N be any two arguments
of σ.
—If a 6= 0 6= b, a = 〈x, y〉 is odd, and b is even, then define σ(a, b) = even(ρ(x, y)).
—If a 6= 0 6= b, a is even, and b = 〈x, y〉 is odd, then define σ(a, b) = even(ρ(x, y)).
—If a 6= 0 6= b, and a is odd if and only if b is odd, then define σ(a, b) = odd(a+ b).
—If a = 0 or b = 0, then define σ(a, b) = a+ b.
We claim that σ is strongly noninvertible. For a contradiction, suppose σ were
invertible with respect to its first argument via an inverter, g1. By the definition
of σ, for any z ∈ image(ρ) with z 6= 0, the function g1 on input 〈2, even(z)〉 yields
an odd integer b from which we can read the pair 〈x, y〉 with ρ(x, y) = z. Hence,
using g1, one could invert ρ in polynomial time, a contradiction. Thus, σ is not
invertible with respect to its first argument. Analogously, one can show that σ
is not invertible with respect to its second argument. So, σ indeed is strongly
noninvertible.
But σ is invertible! By the fourth line in the definition of σ, every z in the image
of σ has a preimage of the form (0, z). Thus, the function g defined by g(z) = (0, z)
inverts σ in polynomial time. Hence, σ is not a one-way function.
Why don’t we use a different notion of strongness that automatically implies
noninvertibility? Here is an attempt to redefine the notion of strongness accordingly,
which yields a new notion that we will call “overstrongness.”
Definition 5.8. [HPR01] Let σ : N × N → N be any two-ary function; σ may
be nontotal and it may be many-to-one. We say that σ is overstrong if and only if
no polynomial-time computable function f with f : {1, 2}×N×N→ N×N satisfies
that for each i ∈ {1, 2} and for each z, a ∈ N:
((∃b ∈ N)[(σ(a, b) = z ∧ i = 1) ∨ (σ(b, a) = z ∧ i = 2)]) =⇒ σ(f(i, z, a)) = z.
Note that overstrongness implies both noninvertibility and strong noninvertibil-
ity. However, the problem with this new definition is that it completely loses the
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core of why strongness precludes direct attacks on the Rivest–Sherman and Rabi–
Sherman protocols protocols. To see why, look at Figure 10 and Figure 11, which
give the protocols of Rabi, Rivest, and Sherman. In contrast to overstrongness,
Rabi, Rivest, and Sherman’s original definition of strong noninvertibility (see Defi-
nition 5.1) respects the argument given. It is this feature that precludes Erich from
being able to compute Alice’s secret x from the transmitted values σ(x, y) and y,
which he knows. In short, overstrongness is not well-motivated by the protocols of
Rabi, Rivest, and Sherman.
We mention without proof some further results of Hemaspaandra, Pasanen, and
Rothe [HPR01].
Theorem 5.9. [HPR01]
(1 ) If P 6= NP then there exists a total, honest, s-honest, two-ary overstrong func-
tion. Consequently, if P 6= NP then there exists a total two-ary function that
is both one-way and strongly one-way.
(2 ) If P 6= NP then there exists a total, s-honest two-ary one-way function σ such
that σ is invertible with respect to its first argument and σ is invertible with
respect to its second argument.
(3 ) If P 6= NP then there exists a total, s-honest two-ary one-way function that is
invertible with respect to either one of its arguments (thus, it is not strongly
one-way), yet that is not invertible with respect to its other argument.
(4 ) If P 6= NP then there exists a total, honest, s-honest two-ary function that is
noninvertible and strongly noninvertible but that is not overstrong.
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